Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/page_alloc: fix initialization of tags of the huge zero folio with init_on_free
__GFP_ZEROTAGS semantics are currently a bit weird, but effectively this flag is only ever set alongside __GFP_ZERO and __GFP_SKIP_KASAN.
If we run with init_on_free, we will zero out pages during __free_pages_prepare(), to skip zeroing on the allocation path.
However, when allocating with __GFP_ZEROTAG set, post_alloc_hook() will consequently not only skip clearing page content, but also skip clearing tag memory.
Not clearing tags through __GFP_ZEROTAGS is irrelevant for most pages that will get mapped to user space through set_pte_at() later: set_pte_at() and friends will detect that the tags have not been initialized yet (PG_mte_tagged not set), and initialize them.
However, for the huge zero folio, which will be mapped through a PMD marked as special, this initialization will not be performed, ending up exposing whatever tag...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/page_alloc: fix initialization of tags of the huge zero folio with init_on_free
__GFP_ZEROTAGS semantics are currently a bit weird, but effectively this flag is only ever set alongside __GFP_ZERO and __GFP_SKIP_KASAN.
If we run with init_on_free, we will zero out pages during __free_pages_prepare(), to skip zeroing on the allocation path.
However, when allocating with __GFP_ZEROTAG set, post_alloc_hook() will consequently not only skip clearing page content, but also skip clearing tag memory.
Not clearing tags through __GFP_ZEROTAGS is irrelevant for most pages that will get mapped to user space through set_pte_at() later: set_pte_at() and friends will detect that the tags have not been initialized yet (PG_mte_tagged not set), and initialize them.
However, for the huge zero folio, which will be mapped through a PMD marked as special, this initialization will not be performed, ending up exposing whatever tags were still set for the pages.
The docs (Documentation/arch/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst) state that allocation tags are set to 0 when a page is first mapped to user space. That no longer holds with the huge zero folio when init_on_free is enabled.
Fix it by decoupling __GFP_ZEROTAGS from __GFP_ZERO, passing to tag_clear_highpages() whether we want to also clear page content.
Invert the meaning of the tag_clear_highpages() return value to have clearer semantics.
Reproduced with the huge zero folio by modifying the check_buffer_fill arm64/mte selftest to use a 2 MiB area, after making sure that pages have a non-0 tag set when freeing (note that, during boot, we will not actually initialize tags, but only set KASAN_TAG_KERNEL in the page flags).
This code needs more cleanups; we'll tackle that next, like decoupling __GFP_ZEROTAGS from __GFP_SKIP_KASAN.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/__GPF_ZERO/__GFP_ZERO/, per David]
EPSS
CVE ID
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/page_alloc: fix initialization of tags of the huge zero folio with init_on_free __GFP_ZEROTAGS semantics are currently a bit weird, but effectively this flag is only ever set alongside __GFP_ZERO and __GFP_SKIP_KASAN. If we run with init_on_free, we will zero out pages during __free_pages_prepare(), to skip zeroing on the allocation path. However, when allocating with __GFP_ZEROTAG set, post_alloc_hook() will consequently not only skip clearing page content, but also skip clearing tag memory. Not clearing tags through __GFP_ZEROTAGS is irrelevant for most pages that will get mapped to user space through set_pte_at() later: set_pte_at() and friends will detect that the tags have not been initialized yet (PG_mte_tagged not set), and initialize them. However, for the huge zero folio, which will be mapped through a PMD marked as special, this initialization will not be performed, ending up exposing whatever tags were...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/page_alloc: fix initialization of tags of the huge zero folio with init_on_free __GFP_ZEROTAGS semantics are currently a bit weird, but effectively this flag is only ever set alongside __GFP_ZERO and __GFP_SKIP_KASAN. If we run with init_on_free, we will zero out pages during __free_pages_prepare(), to skip zeroing on the allocation path. However, when allocating with __GFP_ZEROTAG set, post_alloc_hook() will consequently not only skip clearing page content, but also skip clearing tag memory. Not clearing tags through __GFP_ZEROTAGS is irrelevant for most pages that will get mapped to user space through set_pte_at() later: set_pte_at() and friends will detect that the tags have not been initialized yet (PG_mte_tagged not set), and initialize them. However, for the huge zero folio, which will be mapped through a PMD marked as special, this initialization will not be performed, ending up exposing whatever tags were...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/page_alloc: fix initialization of tags of the huge zero folio with init_on_free __GFP_ZEROTAGS semantics are currently a bit weird, but effectively this flag is only ever set alongside __GFP_ZERO and __GFP_SKIP_KASAN. If we run with init_on_free, we will zero out pages during __free_pages_prepare(), to skip zeroing on the allocation path. However, when allocating with __GFP_ZEROTAG set, post_alloc_hook() will consequently not only skip clearing page content, but also skip clearing tag memory. Not clearing tags through __GFP_ZEROTAGS is irrelevant for most pages that will get mapped to user space through set_pte_at() later: set_pte_at() and friends will detect that the tags have not been initialized yet (PG_mte_tagged not set), and initialize them. However, for the huge zero folio, which will be mapped through a PMD marked as special, this initialization will not be performed, ending up exposing whatever tags w
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: m ...
EPSS