Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing
sof_parse_token_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available.
Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete snd_soc_tplg_vendor_array header before reading array->size.
The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int, but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check, as reported in the stable review thread reference below.
Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser dispatches to the tuple-specific co...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing
sof_parse_token_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available.
Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete snd_soc_tplg_vendor_array header before reading array->size.
The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int, but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check, as reported in the stable review thread reference below.
Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser dispatches to the tuple-specific code.
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72300
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/201b60c4d15538fcc3c0c2ea9b75dd7d0f58022c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c6d2d2baeb1e62dc8c6951d27edc16c5ea6e3aa
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8468dd79cfb2ffbdeaf7c353f63d64941cb8ba05
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a40e250414b463e953c54cd2a829c9a9a49a78c3
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d34deef34c99bb4b3ebd2ac51058857827a20e7e
EPSS
CVE ID
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing sof_parse_token_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available. Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete snd_soc_tplg_vendor_array header before reading array->size. The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int, but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check, as reported in the stable review thread reference below. Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser dispatches to the tuple-specific code.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing sof_parse_token_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available. Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete snd_soc_tplg_vendor_array header before reading array->size. The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int, but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check, as reported in the stable review thread reference below. Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser dispatches to the tuple-specific code.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing sof_parse_token_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available. Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete snd_soc_tplg_vendor_array header before reading array->size. The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int, but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check, as reported in the stable review thread reference below. Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser dispatches to the tuple-specific code.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: A ...
EPSS