GHSA-m4rf-3fr8-xwx3

Описание

Vulnerability

The fix for CVE-2026-12841 (CWE-88, JVM argument injection) added _validate_java_options() to block dangerous JVM flags such as -agentlib, -agentpath, -javaagent, -Xrunjdwp, and @argfile references. However, the validation is only applied when setting global options via config_java(). The java() function's per-call options parameter -- added by PR #3683 (CVE-2026-12615 fix) -- passes options directly to subprocess.Popen without calling _validate_java_options().

All four Stanford Java wrapper classes accept user-supplied java_options and route them through the unvalidated per-call path, bypassing the CVE-2026-12841 fix entirely.

Root Cause

In nltk/internals.py, the java() function (line 128) accepts an options keyword argument. When options is not None, it is converted to a list and prepended to the JVM command (lines 211-217) without any validation:

Compare with config_java() (line 92) which does validate:

The four affected wrapper classes store user-supplied java_options without validation and pass them through the unvalidated per-call path:

1. GenericStanfordParser (nltk/parse/stanford.py): constructor parameter at line 39, stored at line 78, passed at lines 247 and 256
2. StanfordTagger (nltk/tag/stanford.py): constructor parameter at line 51, stored at line 79, passed at line 118
3. StanfordTokenizer (nltk/tokenize/stanford.py): constructor parameter at line 43, stored at line 66, passed at line 109
4. StanfordSegmenter (nltk/tokenize/stanford_segmenter.py): constructor parameter at line 68, stored at line 117, passed at line 337

Proof of Concept

Impact

An attacker who controls the java_options parameter to any NLTK Stanford wrapper class can inject arbitrary JVM flags, including:

• -agentpath:/path/to/malicious.so -- loads a native agent, achieving arbitrary code execution
• -javaagent:/path/to/malicious.jar -- loads a Java agent for bytecode manipulation
• -agentlib:jdwp=transport=dt_socket,server=y,address=*:5005 -- enables remote debugging, allowing remote code execution
• @/path/to/argfile -- expands an argument file, which can smuggle any of the above

This is exploitable in scenarios where NLTK is deployed as a service and java_options is derived from user input, configuration files, or environment variables. The PR #3647 commit message explicitly states the fix was intended to cover "StanfordSegmenter, and GenericStanfordParser" but the implementation only validates in config_java().

Suggested Fix

Add _validate_java_options() to the java() function's per-call options handling:

This single-line addition closes the bypass for all four Stanford wrapper classes and any future callers of java(options=...).

AI tooling

AI assistance was used for the code audit and for drafting this report. The finding were manually verified against the project's source at the location cited above before reporting it, and the severity and impact assessment are the reporters.