Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: validate metadata when processing requests
The zero-copy path validates TX metadata while obtaining the descriptor context, then reads it again later when preparing the hardware request. User space can change the metadata between those operations and bypass the original validation.
Validate the metadata in xsk_tx_metadata_request() and use the resulting flags snapshot for every feature check. Read request fields once so all zero-copy drivers process only values observed after successful validation.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: validate metadata when processing requests
The zero-copy path validates TX metadata while obtaining the descriptor context, then reads it again later when preparing the hardware request. User space can change the metadata between those operations and bypass the original validation.
Validate the metadata in xsk_tx_metadata_request() and use the resulting flags snapshot for every feature check. Read request fields once so all zero-copy drivers process only values observed after successful validation.
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xsk: validate metadata when processing requests The zero-copy path validates TX metadata while obtaining the descriptor context, then reads it again later when preparing the hardware request. User space can change the metadata between those operations and bypass the original validation. Validate the metadata in xsk_tx_metadata_request() and use the resulting flags snapshot for every feature check. Read request fields once so all zero-copy drivers process only values observed after successful validation.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xsk: validate metadata when processing requests The zero-copy path validates TX metadata while obtaining the descriptor context, then reads it again later when preparing the hardware request. User space can change the metadata between those operations and bypass the original validation. Validate the metadata in xsk_tx_metadata_request() and use the resulting flags snapshot for every feature check. Read request fields once so all zero-copy drivers process only values observed after successful validation.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xsk: validate metadata when processing requests The zero-copy path validates TX metadata while obtaining the descriptor context, then reads it again later when preparing the hardware request. User space can change the metadata between those operations and bypass the original validation. Validate the metadata in xsk_tx_metadata_request() and use the resulting flags snapshot for every feature check. Read request fields once so all zero-copy drivers process only values observed after successful validation.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x ...