Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap
Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file's mount's idmap. This results in odd edgecases like:
- mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1
- userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation
- owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn't supplied
In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign, because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a 0444 file where even the owner itself doesn't have permissions to write to it.
Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, ...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap
Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file's mount's idmap. This results in odd edgecases like:
- mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1
- userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation
- owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn't supplied
In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign, because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a 0444 file where even the owner itself doesn't have permissions to write to it.
Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, introduce a file_owner_or_capable() that can carry the correct semantics, and switch the various users in mm to it.
The issue was found by manual code inspection & an off-list discussion with Jan Kara.
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64294
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/04ba248d02d9eaa3d9077b00a6134caa75fa3e90
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c942ad7df75925ee166e7f0fb36892d8dde376b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7368bec565bac3e536cd43579dbde1e715e6ba61
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/744b23aa430d52f5c8e4dbff7d71496d6643bed2
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8344bdf0629457e532797b42d9d2bbf2a2900bbf
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b2f3d94ea310bea9d36d53e9d9b3f45e86c1d893
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e187bc02f8fa4226d62814592cf064ee4557c470
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file's mount's idmap. This results in odd edgecases like: 1) mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1 2) userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation 3) owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn't supplied In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign, because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a 0444 file where even the owner itself doesn't have permissions to write to it. Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, intro...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file's mount's idmap. This results in odd edgecases like: 1) mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1 2) userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation 3) owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn't supplied In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign, because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a 0444 file where even the owner itself doesn't have permissions to write to it. Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, intro...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file's mount's idmap. This results in odd edgecases like: 1) mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1 2) userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation 3) owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn't supplied In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign, because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a 0444 file where even the owner itself doesn't have permissions to write to it. Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, int
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: m ...