Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: dev: prevent integer overflow in I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl
While fuzzing with Syzkaller, a persistent schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value warning was observed, accompanied by SMBus controller
state machine corruption.
The I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl accepts a user-provided timeout in multiples of 10 ms. The user argument is checked against INT_MAX, but it is subsequently multiplied by 10 before being passed to msecs_to_jiffies().
A malicious user can pass a large value (e.g., 429496729) that passes
the arg > INT_MAX check but overflows when multiplied by 10. This
results in a truncated 32-bit unsigned value that bypasses the
internal (int)m < 0 check in msecs_to_jiffies().
The truncated value is then assigned to client->adapter->timeout
(a signed 32-bit int), which is reinterpreted as a negative number.
When passed to wait_for_completion_timeout(), this negative value
undergoes sign extension to a 64-bit unsigne...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: dev: prevent integer overflow in I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl
While fuzzing with Syzkaller, a persistent schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value warning was observed, accompanied by SMBus controller
state machine corruption.
The I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl accepts a user-provided timeout in multiples of 10 ms. The user argument is checked against INT_MAX, but it is subsequently multiplied by 10 before being passed to msecs_to_jiffies().
A malicious user can pass a large value (e.g., 429496729) that passes
the arg > INT_MAX check but overflows when multiplied by 10. This
results in a truncated 32-bit unsigned value that bypasses the
internal (int)m < 0 check in msecs_to_jiffies().
The truncated value is then assigned to client->adapter->timeout
(a signed 32-bit int), which is reinterpreted as a negative number.
When passed to wait_for_completion_timeout(), this negative value
undergoes sign extension to a 64-bit unsigned long, triggering the
schedule_timeout warning and causing premature returns. This leaves
the SMBus state machine in an unrecoverable state, constituting a
local Denial of Service (DoS).
Fix this by bounding the user argument to INT_MAX / 10.
[wsa: move the comment as well]
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52948
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b88ecfbc9dc33b4db8836c37b50cf174e6c0691
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4576621dc6577f21a032acfd16c3ad61907a5ea7
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/617eb7c0961a8dfcfc811844a6396e406b2923ea
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/943e318eedbeaeea08ece3f5dd44c982f4ed2ef5
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa6ef734016912653a909477fb30aeb66c98b3a2
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9ffd5f5050fbb199d270a85614cd27ebed6fbac
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff02add34ffd03449b8115904ebe2ec4fed022d4
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ffbcf31f032eb454ebfd29309f51366fe57f4ac4
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: dev: prevent integer overflow in I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl While fuzzing with Syzkaller, a persistent `schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value` warning was observed, accompanied by SMBus controller state machine corruption. The I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl accepts a user-provided timeout in multiples of 10 ms. The user argument is checked against INT_MAX, but it is subsequently multiplied by 10 before being passed to msecs_to_jiffies(). A malicious user can pass a large value (e.g., 429496729) that passes the `arg > INT_MAX` check but overflows when multiplied by 10. This results in a truncated 32-bit unsigned value that bypasses the internal `(int)m < 0` check in `msecs_to_jiffies()`. The truncated value is then assigned to `client->adapter->timeout` (a signed 32-bit int), which is reinterpreted as a negative number. When passed to wait_for_completion_timeout(), this negative value undergoes sign extension to a 64-bit unsigned lon...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: dev: prevent integer overflow in I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl While fuzzing with Syzkaller, a persistent `schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value` warning was observed, accompanied by SMBus controller state machine corruption. The I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl accepts a user-provided timeout in multiples of 10 ms. The user argument is checked against INT_MAX, but it is subsequently multiplied by 10 before being passed to msecs_to_jiffies(). A malicious user can pass a large value (e.g., 429496729) that passes the `arg > INT_MAX` check but overflows when multiplied by 10. This results in a truncated 32-bit unsigned value that bypasses the internal `(int)m < 0` check in `msecs_to_jiffies()`. The truncated value is then assigned to `client->adapter->timeout` (a signed 32-bit int), which is reinterpreted as a negative number. When passed to wait_for_completion_timeout(), this negative value undergoes sign extension to a 64-bit unsigned lon...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: dev: prevent integer overflow in I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl While fuzzing with Syzkaller, a persistent `schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value` warning was observed, accompanied by SMBus controller state machine corruption. The I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl accepts a user-provided timeout in multiples of 10 ms. The user argument is checked against INT_MAX, but it is subsequently multiplied by 10 before being passed to msecs_to_jiffies(). A malicious user can pass a large value (e.g., 429496729) that passes the `arg > INT_MAX` check but overflows when multiplied by 10. This results in a truncated 32-bit unsigned value that bypasses the internal `(int)m < 0` check in `msecs_to_jiffies()`. The truncated value is then assigned to `client->adapter->timeout` (a signed 32-bit int), which is reinterpreted as a negative number. When passed to wait_for_completion_timeout(), this negative value undergoes sign extension to a 64-bit unsigned l
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i ...