Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate VAT header length against the VAT inode size
udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition's start offset straight from the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode size:
lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value. If it exceeds the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge count, which defeats the "block > s_num_entries" bound in udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads
so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode's in-ICB data. Mounting a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Reject a...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate VAT header length against the VAT inode size
udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition's start offset straight from the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode size:
lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value. If it exceeds the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge count, which defeats the "block > s_num_entries" bound in udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads
so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode's in-ICB data. Mounting a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Reject a VAT whose header length does not leave room for at least one entry within the VAT inode.
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64323
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ad2d09a8d66fa8dc6f9b70d660b5fb4478ea934
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2900e02a0dd4fc30ac9840e7ce4ca0b041ab0d63
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55287a3555ff0515b3aff181d2c08c0462a41709
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74580fdf022909e184223cacc364feb826982d96
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/883962731420ec271ed8c1cd76524f4b17faa982
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb0d384c1f42a5b7ace0bd88fee80b9bb1d49acb
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8202786b3d75125c84ebc4de6d946f92fde0ee8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e610fb113cdfa8bf4247c9bf4f2337b81ad4ddad
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udf: validate VAT header length against the VAT inode size udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition's start offset straight from the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode size: map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset = le16_to_cpu(vat20->lengthHeader); map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries = (sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size - map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset) >> 2; lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value. If it exceeds the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge count, which defeats the "block > s_num_entries" bound in udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads ((__le32 *)(iinfo->i_data + s_start_offset))[block] so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode's in-ICB data. Mounting a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an out-of-bounds read. Reject a VAT whose header...
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's Universal Disk Format (UDF) filesystem. A local attacker could craft a malicious UDF image with a specially formed Virtual Allocation Table (VAT) header. When this image is mounted, the kernel fails to properly validate the VAT header length against the VAT inode size. This can lead to an out-of-bounds read, potentially causing a system crash or information disclosure.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udf: validate VAT header length against the VAT inode size udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition's start offset straight from the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode size: map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset = le16_to_cpu(vat20->lengthHeader); map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries = (sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size - map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset) >> 2; lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value. If it exceeds the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge count, which defeats the "block > s_num_entries" bound in udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads ((__le32 *)(iinfo->i_data + s_start_offset))[block] so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode's in-ICB data. Mounting a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an out-of-bounds read. Reject a VA
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: u ...