Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Zero SFP DMA buffer in FRU/I2C bsg handlers
The FRU and I2C bsg handlers stage their transfer in a DMA_POOL_SIZE (256-byte) bounce buffer obtained from dma_pool_alloc(), which does not zero the allocation. They initialize only a few leading bytes before handing the buffer to qla2x00_write_sfp().
qla2x00_write_sfp() can override the transfer length with a user-supplied value:
*sfp is the first byte of the (user-controlled) payload, so len can grow up to 255. The device then DMA-reads len bytes from the 256-byte pool buffer. Since only a small prefix was written (e.g. MAX_FRU_SIZE == 36 bytes for a FRU version, one byte for a FRU status register), the hardware reads past the initialized region and writes up to ~219 bytes of stale DMA-pool heap memory to the device flash.
Allocate the buffer with dma_pool_zalloc() in all five FRU/I2C ha...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Zero SFP DMA buffer in FRU/I2C bsg handlers
The FRU and I2C bsg handlers stage their transfer in a DMA_POOL_SIZE (256-byte) bounce buffer obtained from dma_pool_alloc(), which does not zero the allocation. They initialize only a few leading bytes before handing the buffer to qla2x00_write_sfp().
qla2x00_write_sfp() can override the transfer length with a user-supplied value:
*sfp is the first byte of the (user-controlled) payload, so len can grow up to 255. The device then DMA-reads len bytes from the 256-byte pool buffer. Since only a small prefix was written (e.g. MAX_FRU_SIZE == 36 bytes for a FRU version, one byte for a FRU status register), the hardware reads past the initialized region and writes up to ~219 bytes of stale DMA-pool heap memory to the device flash.
Allocate the buffer with dma_pool_zalloc() in all five FRU/I2C handlers so any bytes beyond the initialized data are zero rather than stale heap contents.
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89865
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/09703bc7c0be3a7a155b0ff5f21f6765ba3f519c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/581590f560b74399151b3cbc88574424c2f3d2dc
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84bde5ce4038d9ad811e5c994305bbfcbd7a9f79
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97c45c75f5cdec96b1a4fba8b1d55d0dd01af1e8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a476377a66897549dd49bee319f4df66623417b7
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a5501c42256235523c4dddf799f032dfbf4f4c77
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b157256c28086c434afd70cc78bf9b4d8caf1276
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b47d4a1547d9ef21b2e9d1a739fe2204d4be05dc
EPSS
CVE ID
Связанные уязвимости
(In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s ...)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Zero SFP DMA buffer in FRU/I2C bsg handlers The FRU and I2C bsg handlers stage their transfer in a DMA_POOL_SIZE (256-byte) bounce buffer obtained from dma_pool_alloc(), which does not zero the allocation. They initialize only a few leading bytes before handing the buffer to qla2x00_write_sfp(). qla2x00_write_sfp() can override the transfer length with a user-supplied value: if (len == 1) opt |= BIT_0; if (opt & BIT_0) len = *sfp; *sfp is the first byte of the (user-controlled) payload, so len can grow up to 255. The device then DMA-reads len bytes from the 256-byte pool buffer. Since only a small prefix was written (e.g. MAX_FRU_SIZE == 36 bytes for a FRU version, one byte for a FRU status register), the hardware reads past the initialized region and writes up to ~219 bytes of stale DMA-pool heap memory to the device flash. Allocate the buffer with dma_pool_zalloc() in all five FRU/I2C handl
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s ...
EPSS