Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_tcm: Fix NULL pointer dereferences in nexus handling
The tpg->tpg_nexus pointer in the USB Target driver is dynamically
managed and tied to userspace configuration via ConfigFS. It can be
NULL if the USB host sends requests before the nexus is fully
established or immediately after it is dropped.
Currently, functions like bot_submit_command() and the data
transfer paths retrieve tv_nexus = tpg->tpg_nexus and immediately
dereference tv_nexus->tvn_se_sess without any validation. If a
malicious or misconfigured USB host sends a BOT (Bulk-Only Transport)
command during this race window, it triggers a NULL pointer
dereference, leading to a kernel panic (local DoS).
This exposes an inconsistent API usage within the module, as peer
functions like usbg_submit_command() and bot_send_bad_response()
correctly implement a NULL check for tv_nexus before proceeding.
Fix this by bringing consisten...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_tcm: Fix NULL pointer dereferences in nexus handling
The tpg->tpg_nexus pointer in the USB Target driver is dynamically
managed and tied to userspace configuration via ConfigFS. It can be
NULL if the USB host sends requests before the nexus is fully
established or immediately after it is dropped.
Currently, functions like bot_submit_command() and the data
transfer paths retrieve tv_nexus = tpg->tpg_nexus and immediately
dereference tv_nexus->tvn_se_sess without any validation. If a
malicious or misconfigured USB host sends a BOT (Bulk-Only Transport)
command during this race window, it triggers a NULL pointer
dereference, leading to a kernel panic (local DoS).
This exposes an inconsistent API usage within the module, as peer
functions like usbg_submit_command() and bot_send_bad_response()
correctly implement a NULL check for tv_nexus before proceeding.
Fix this by bringing consistency to the nexus handling. Add the
missing if (!tv_nexus) checks to the vulnerable BOT command and
request processing paths, aborting the command gracefully with an
error instead of crashing the system.
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43424
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a2ef846a54a06c33b5c2d4b0d918583e1e7c0b7
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d309b37633c4a847fc149939a2c9576f1aa1065
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/679d9535aeb15c10bce89c44102004b96624d706
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9b26d7f3aa288cfa54a7bc68612bab1f153f156
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9fde507355342a2d64225d582dc8b98ff5ecb19
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d146f27758049fa55ae4c53785a852d3cf7a18d6
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f962ca3b020e13d6714f27e8c36fe742441c58d1
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_tcm: Fix NULL pointer dereferences in nexus handling The `tpg->tpg_nexus` pointer in the USB Target driver is dynamically managed and tied to userspace configuration via ConfigFS. It can be NULL if the USB host sends requests before the nexus is fully established or immediately after it is dropped. Currently, functions like `bot_submit_command()` and the data transfer paths retrieve `tv_nexus = tpg->tpg_nexus` and immediately dereference `tv_nexus->tvn_se_sess` without any validation. If a malicious or misconfigured USB host sends a BOT (Bulk-Only Transport) command during this race window, it triggers a NULL pointer dereference, leading to a kernel panic (local DoS). This exposes an inconsistent API usage within the module, as peer functions like `usbg_submit_command()` and `bot_send_bad_response()` correctly implement a NULL check for `tv_nexus` before proceeding. Fix this by bringing consistency to...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_tcm: Fix NULL pointer dereferences in nexus handling The `tpg->tpg_nexus` pointer in the USB Target driver is dynamically managed and tied to userspace configuration via ConfigFS. It can be NULL if the USB host sends requests before the nexus is fully established or immediately after it is dropped. Currently, functions like `bot_submit_command()` and the data transfer paths retrieve `tv_nexus = tpg->tpg_nexus` and immediately dereference `tv_nexus->tvn_se_sess` without any validation. If a malicious or misconfigured USB host sends a BOT (Bulk-Only Transport) command during this race window, it triggers a NULL pointer dereference, leading to a kernel panic (local DoS). This exposes an inconsistent API usage within the module, as peer functions like `usbg_submit_command()` and `bot_send_bad_response()` correctly implement a NULL check for `tv_nexus` before proceeding. Fix this by bringing consistency to...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_tcm: Fix NULL pointer dereferences in nexus handling The `tpg->tpg_nexus` pointer in the USB Target driver is dynamically managed and tied to userspace configuration via ConfigFS. It can be NULL if the USB host sends requests before the nexus is fully established or immediately after it is dropped. Currently, functions like `bot_submit_command()` and the data transfer paths retrieve `tv_nexus = tpg->tpg_nexus` and immediately dereference `tv_nexus->tvn_se_sess` without any validation. If a malicious or misconfigured USB host sends a BOT (Bulk-Only Transport) command during this race window, it triggers a NULL pointer dereference, leading to a kernel panic (local DoS). This exposes an inconsistent API usage within the module, as peer functions like `usbg_submit_command()` and `bot_send_bad_response()` correctly implement a NULL check for `tv_nexus` before proceeding. Fix this by bringing consistency
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: u ...