Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Forget ranges when refining tnum after JSET
Syzbot reported a kernel warning due to a range invariant violation on the following BPF program.
0: call bpf_get_netns_cookie 1: if r0 == 0 goto 2: if r0 & Oxffffffff goto
The issue is on the path where we fall through both jumps.
That path is unreachable at runtime: after insn 1, we know r0 != 0, but with the sign extension on the jset, we would only fallthrough insn 2 if r0 == 0. Unfortunately, is_branch_taken() isn't currently able to figure this out, so the verifier walks all branches. The verifier then refines the register bounds using the second condition and we end up with inconsistent bounds on this unreachable path:
1: if r0 == 0 goto r0: u64=[0x1, 0xffffffffffffffff] var_off=(0, 0xffffffffffffffff) 2: if r0 & 0xffffffff goto r0 before reg_bounds_sync: u64=[0x1, 0xffffffffffffffff] var_off=(0, 0) r0 aft...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Forget ranges when refining tnum after JSET
Syzbot reported a kernel warning due to a range invariant violation on the following BPF program.
0: call bpf_get_netns_cookie 1: if r0 == 0 goto 2: if r0 & Oxffffffff goto
The issue is on the path where we fall through both jumps.
That path is unreachable at runtime: after insn 1, we know r0 != 0, but with the sign extension on the jset, we would only fallthrough insn 2 if r0 == 0. Unfortunately, is_branch_taken() isn't currently able to figure this out, so the verifier walks all branches. The verifier then refines the register bounds using the second condition and we end up with inconsistent bounds on this unreachable path:
1: if r0 == 0 goto r0: u64=[0x1, 0xffffffffffffffff] var_off=(0, 0xffffffffffffffff) 2: if r0 & 0xffffffff goto r0 before reg_bounds_sync: u64=[0x1, 0xffffffffffffffff] var_off=(0, 0) r0 after reg_bounds_sync: u64=[0x1, 0] var_off=(0, 0)
Improving the range refinement for JSET to cover all cases is tricky. We also don't expect many users to rely on JSET given LLVM doesn't generate those instructions. So instead of improving the range refinement for JSETs, Eduard suggested we forget the ranges whenever we're narrowing tnums after a JSET. This patch implements that approach.
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39748
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2fd0c26bacd90ef26522bd3169000a4715bf151f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6279846b9b2532e1b04559ef8bd0dec049f29383
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80a6b11862a7cfdf691e8f9faee89cfea219f098
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f01e06930444cab289a8783017af9b64255bd103
EPSS
CVE ID
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Forget ranges when refining tnum after JSET Syzbot reported a kernel warning due to a range invariant violation on the following BPF program. 0: call bpf_get_netns_cookie 1: if r0 == 0 goto <exit> 2: if r0 & Oxffffffff goto <exit> The issue is on the path where we fall through both jumps. That path is unreachable at runtime: after insn 1, we know r0 != 0, but with the sign extension on the jset, we would only fallthrough insn 2 if r0 == 0. Unfortunately, is_branch_taken() isn't currently able to figure this out, so the verifier walks all branches. The verifier then refines the register bounds using the second condition and we end up with inconsistent bounds on this unreachable path: 1: if r0 == 0 goto <exit> r0: u64=[0x1, 0xffffffffffffffff] var_off=(0, 0xffffffffffffffff) 2: if r0 & 0xffffffff goto <exit> r0 before reg_bounds_sync: u64=[0x1, 0xffffffffffffffff] var_off=(0, 0) r0 after reg_bounds_sync: u64=[0x...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Forget ranges when refining tnum after JSET Syzbot reported a kernel warning due to a range invariant violation on the following BPF program. 0: call bpf_get_netns_cookie 1: if r0 == 0 goto <exit> 2: if r0 & Oxffffffff goto <exit> The issue is on the path where we fall through both jumps. That path is unreachable at runtime: after insn 1, we know r0 != 0, but with the sign extension on the jset, we would only fallthrough insn 2 if r0 == 0. Unfortunately, is_branch_taken() isn't currently able to figure this out, so the verifier walks all branches. The verifier then refines the register bounds using the second condition and we end up with inconsistent bounds on this unreachable path: 1: if r0 == 0 goto <exit> r0: u64=[0x1, 0xffffffffffffffff] var_off=(0, 0xffffffffffffffff) 2: if r0 & 0xffffffff goto <exit> r0 before reg_bounds_sync: u64=[0x1, 0xffffffffffffffff] var_off=(0, 0) r0 after reg_bounds_sync: u64=[0x...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Forget ranges when refining tnum after JSET Syzbot reported a kernel warning due to a range invariant violation on the following BPF program. 0: call bpf_get_netns_cookie 1: if r0 == 0 goto <exit> 2: if r0 & Oxffffffff goto <exit> The issue is on the path where we fall through both jumps. That path is unreachable at runtime: after insn 1, we know r0 != 0, but with the sign extension on the jset, we would only fallthrough insn 2 if r0 == 0. Unfortunately, is_branch_taken() isn't currently able to figure this out, so the verifier walks all branches. The verifier then refines the register bounds using the second condition and we end up with inconsistent bounds on this unreachable path: 1: if r0 == 0 goto <exit> r0: u64=[0x1, 0xffffffffffffffff] var_off=(0, 0xffffffffffffffff) 2: if r0 & 0xffffffff goto <exit> r0 before reg_bounds_sync: u64=[0x1, 0xffffffffffffffff] var_off=(0, 0) r0 after
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: b ...
EPSS