Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length
mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a beacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that many 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight from the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the element's own length, and the callers admit the element on element_id alone (has_ieee_hdr() / has_vendor_hdr(), no length check). A crafted RSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up to 255 * 4 bytes past the element -- an out-of-bounds read of the kmemdup()'d beacon buffer, reachable from any AP whose beacon/probe response is processed during scan-result parsing.
Pass the number of IE bytes available at the OUI list and bound the walk to the element. Keep the length signed and reject a negative value before any unsigned arithmetic, so a small...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length
mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a beacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that many 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight from the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the element's own length, and the callers admit the element on element_id alone (has_ieee_hdr() / has_vendor_hdr(), no length check). A crafted RSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up to 255 * 4 bytes past the element -- an out-of-bounds read of the kmemdup()'d beacon buffer, reachable from any AP whose beacon/probe response is processed during scan-result parsing.
Pass the number of IE bytes available at the OUI list and bound the walk to the element. Keep the length signed and reject a negative value before any unsigned arithmetic, so a small or zero IE length cannot underflow to a large size_t and defeat the bound.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98186
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2402c9e2644b7e10c7aaaf87bf12743d7e363559
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46cda9d42f0d6ec3057d878ddb1f38c0ab9f51df
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/54a9cc5bd70b0d77a5069d4c46998c679a10c857
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58767b41f87244eebaa5a475b9d276c83b89b933
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77e642af7f2f6029e12a35c847c56cbd0466e799
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8bbef2b1ebfbadc0b9c37bbbf9c9e26fe2e41960
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/982b8fcdbb28f63bbbf02f0822c0bbda12ec27ed
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e667aee1c192d67d27c803007bfa9c6e0873e959
EPSS
CVE ID
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a beacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that many 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight from the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the element's own length, and the callers admit the element on element_id alone (has_ieee_hdr() / has_vendor_hdr(), no length check). A crafted RSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up to 255 * 4 bytes past the element -- an out-of-bounds read of the kmemdup()'d beacon buffer, reachable from any AP whose beacon/probe response is processed during scan-result parsing. Pass the number of IE bytes available at the OUI list and bound the walk to the element. Keep the length signed and reject a negative value before any unsigned arithmetic, so a small or...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a beacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that many 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight from the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the element's own length, and the callers admit the element on element_id alone (has_ieee_hdr() / has_vendor_hdr(), no length check). A crafted RSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up to 255 * 4 bytes past the element -- an out-of-bounds read of the kmemdup()'d beacon buffer, reachable from any AP whose beacon/probe response is processed during scan-result parsing. Pass the number of IE bytes available at the OUI list and bound the walk to the element. Keep the length signed and reject a negative value before any unsigned arithmetic, so a small or...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a beacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that many 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight from the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the element's own length, and the callers admit the element on element_id alone (has_ieee_hdr() / has_vendor_hdr(), no length check). A crafted RSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up to 255 * 4 bytes past the element -- an out-of-bounds read of the kmemdup()'d beacon buffer, reachable from any AP whose beacon/probe response is processed during scan-result parsing. Pass the number of IE bytes available at the OUI list and bound the walk to the element. Keep the length signed and reject a negative value before any unsigned arithmetic, so a small or
wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: w ...
EPSS