Описание
Denial of service in quinn-proto when using Endpoint::retry()
Summary
As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to accept(), retry(), refuse(), or ignore() an Incoming connection. However, calling retry() on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations:
- Calling
refuseorignoreon the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received- This issue can go undetected until a server's
refuse()/ignore()code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack.
- This issue can go undetected until a server's
- Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received.
- This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved.
The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.
Details
Location of panic: https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn/blob/bb02a12a8435a7732a1d762783eeacbb7e50418e/quinn-proto/src/endpoint.rs#L213
Impact
Denial of service for internet-facing server
Ссылки
- https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn/security/advisories/GHSA-vr26-jcq5-fjj8
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45311
- https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn/commit/e01609ccd8738bd438d86fa7185a0f85598cb58f
- https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn/blob/bb02a12a8435a7732a1d762783eeacbb7e50418e/quinn-proto/src/endpoint.rs#L213
- https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0373.html
Пакеты
quinn-proto
>= 0.11.0, < 0.11.7
0.11.7
Связанные уязвимости
Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.
Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC ...