Описание
A vulnerability allows a phreaking attack on HCL legacy IVR systems that do not use VoIP. These IVR systems rely on various frequencies of audio signals; based on the frequency, certain commands and functions are processed. Since these frequencies are accepted within a phone call, an attacker can record these frequencies and use them for service activations. This is a request-forgery issue when the required series of DTMF signals for a service activation is predictable (e.g., the IVR system does not speak a nonce to the caller). In this case, the IVR system accepts an activation request from a less-secure channel (any loudspeaker in the caller's physical environment) without verifying that the request was intended (it matches a nonce sent over a more-secure channel to the caller's earpiece).
A vulnerability allows a phreaking attack on HCL legacy IVR systems that do not use VoIP. These IVR systems rely on various frequencies of audio signals; based on the frequency, certain commands and functions are processed. Since these frequencies are accepted within a phone call, an attacker can record these frequencies and use them for service activations. This is a request-forgery issue when the required series of DTMF signals for a service activation is predictable (e.g., the IVR system does not speak a nonce to the caller). In this case, the IVR system accepts an activation request from a less-secure channel (any loudspeaker in the caller's physical environment) without verifying that the request was intended (it matches a nonce sent over a more-secure channel to the caller's earpiece).
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11518
- https://datarift.blogspot.com/2018/05/CVE-2018-11518-abusing-ivr-systems.html
- https://twitter.com/mishradhiraj_/status/1001664204485652482
- https://twitter.com/mishradhiraj_/status/1001664440759091207
- http://virgil-cj.blogspot.com/2018/05/0day-legacy-ivr-lets-phreak.html
Связанные уязвимости
A vulnerability allows a phreaking attack on HCL legacy IVR systems that do not use VoIP. These IVR systems rely on various frequencies of audio signals; based on the frequency, certain commands and functions are processed. Since these frequencies are accepted within a phone call, an attacker can record these frequencies and use them for service activations. This is a request-forgery issue when the required series of DTMF signals for a service activation is predictable (e.g., the IVR system does not speak a nonce to the caller). In this case, the IVR system accepts an activation request from a less-secure channel (any loudspeaker in the caller's physical environment) without verifying that the request was intended (it matches a nonce sent over a more-secure channel to the caller's earpiece).