Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read
When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline data. If the filesystem is corrupted, an inode's i_size can exceed the actual inline data capacity (id_count).
This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline data buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory entries from freed memory.
In the syzbot report:
- i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB)
- Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically <256 bytes
- A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx->pos to jump out of bounds
- This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry()
Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to ensure inodes with inline data have i_size <= id_count. This catches the corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code fro...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read
When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline data. If the filesystem is corrupted, an inode's i_size can exceed the actual inline data capacity (id_count).
This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline data buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory entries from freed memory.
In the syzbot report:
- i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB)
- Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically <256 bytes
- A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx->pos to jump out of bounds
- This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry()
Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to ensure inodes with inline data have i_size <= id_count. This catches the corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code from operating on invalid data.
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43076
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/131c0b573e1b467b7d553e9ff38003f1acd8f5f2
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1524af3685b35feac76662cc551cbc37bd14775f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37f074e65f24f10f8d8df224a572e4cb9e6faf63
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77d0295725109d77f5854ef5b58c0d06c08168cc
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bcd46bc261b215b3b12c557a978299eafa02ecdd
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1de19e891be3bfb3e1d0c7cf07bbb8fb3b77c1b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd2d765aa7157f852999842af32148128c735d39
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d012c782abcabe68b5b9e71be58a15e9f9d83dc1
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline data. If the filesystem is corrupted, an inode's i_size can exceed the actual inline data capacity (id_count). This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline data buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory entries from freed memory. In the syzbot report: - i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB) - Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically <256 bytes - A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx->pos to jump out of bounds - This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry() Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to ensure inodes with inline data have i_size <= id_count. This catches the corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code from operating o...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline data. If the filesystem is corrupted, an inode's i_size can exceed the actual inline data capacity (id_count). This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline data buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory entries from freed memory. In the syzbot report: - i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB) - Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically <256 bytes - A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx->pos to jump out of bounds - This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry() Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to ensure inodes with inline data have i_size <= id_count. This catches the corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code from operating o...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline data. If the filesystem is corrupted, an inode's i_size can exceed the actual inline data capacity (id_count). This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline data buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory entries from freed memory. In the syzbot report: - i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB) - Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically <256 bytes - A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx->pos to jump out of bounds - This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry() Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to ensure inodes with inline data have i_size <= id_count. This catches the corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code from o
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: o ...
ELSA-2026-50372: Unbreakable Enterprise kernel security update (IMPORTANT)