Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer
virtio_get_edid_block() validates the read offset only against the device-supplied resp->size field, never against the fixed-size resp->edid array. The EDID block index is driven by the device-supplied extension count, so a malicious virtio-gpu backend can advertise a large size together with a high block count and read far past the array into adjacent kernel memory, which is then surfaced in the parsed EDID (an out-of-bounds read / info leak).
Also reject any read whose end exceeds the size of the edid array. Conforming EDID responses stay within the array and are unaffected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer
virtio_get_edid_block() validates the read offset only against the device-supplied resp->size field, never against the fixed-size resp->edid array. The EDID block index is driven by the device-supplied extension count, so a malicious virtio-gpu backend can advertise a large size together with a high block count and read far past the array into adjacent kernel memory, which is then surfaced in the parsed EDID (an out-of-bounds read / info leak).
Also reject any read whose end exceeds the size of the edid array. Conforming EDID responses stay within the array and are unaffected.
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68255
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2757e6e803092cf0aeaf4b735e16b5d3bdc705c5
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35be0e2c6862abcd5e5f5445261f1fd910d4a9b4
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/375c1934ef0196d3b6d3a1eae3232bef8dae7bf7
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e1a53892ba7f8a3e1da6bfc53c83ae7c812dccd
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9fc2a017c5d597937e0c28b9a9669844aa796c42
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer virtio_get_edid_block() validates the read offset only against the device-supplied resp->size field, never against the fixed-size resp->edid array. The EDID block index is driven by the device-supplied extension count, so a malicious virtio-gpu backend can advertise a large size together with a high block count and read far past the array into adjacent kernel memory, which is then surfaced in the parsed EDID (an out-of-bounds read / info leak). Also reject any read whose end exceeds the size of the edid array. Conforming EDID responses stay within the array and are unaffected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer virtio_get_edid_block() validates the read offset only against the device-supplied resp->size field, never against the fixed-size resp->edid array. The EDID block index is driven by the device-supplied extension count, so a malicious virtio-gpu backend can advertise a large size together with a high block count and read far past the array into adjacent kernel memory, which is then surfaced in the parsed EDID (an out-of-bounds read / info leak). Also reject any read whose end exceeds the size of the edid array. Conforming EDID responses stay within the array and are unaffected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer virtio_get_edid_block() validates the read offset only against the device-supplied resp->size field, never against the fixed-size resp->edid array. The EDID block index is driven by the device-supplied extension count, so a malicious virtio-gpu backend can advertise a large size together with a high block count and read far past the array into adjacent kernel memory, which is then surfaced in the parsed EDID (an out-of-bounds read / info leak). Also reject any read whose end exceeds the size of the edid array. Conforming EDID responses stay within the array and are unaffected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: d ...