Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: conntrack: avoid modifying shared unconfirmed ct entry
In a case where skb with an unconfirmed ct entry gets cloned, we may end up committing both but with different sets of extensions.
The series of events:
- The first clone wants to commit and runs the helpers wiring up the extension pointer into the expectation list.
- Then it looses the confirmation keeping the entry unconfirmed.
- Second clone now wants to commit labels and adds the new extension for that breaking the pointer in the expectation list causing UAF on the destruction path later.
While this is possible to trigger, there should be no practical network pipeline where committing both clones without modifications into the same zone is needed. So, let's just reset the entry in case for some reason we got an skb with a shared one during commit. This doesn't affect any known use cases, but avoids any potential pro...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: conntrack: avoid modifying shared unconfirmed ct entry
In a case where skb with an unconfirmed ct entry gets cloned, we may end up committing both but with different sets of extensions.
The series of events:
- The first clone wants to commit and runs the helpers wiring up the extension pointer into the expectation list.
- Then it looses the confirmation keeping the entry unconfirmed.
- Second clone now wants to commit labels and adds the new extension for that breaking the pointer in the expectation list causing UAF on the destruction path later.
While this is possible to trigger, there should be no practical network pipeline where committing both clones without modifications into the same zone is needed. So, let's just reset the entry in case for some reason we got an skb with a shared one during commit. This doesn't affect any known use cases, but avoids any potential problems with sharing and modification of the unconfirmed ct entry.
The fixes tag points to the introduction of helpers, since that's the main UAF trigger for the sharing.
Ссылки
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98491
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/26b2bd70d22457556e2fa01cbf1192cb1a94d619
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37e3c878b183a115f9a114067f9ef3b408ad27fb
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/457e0df1b5711fbeb7ba1b6bfd826f5ef30e7e55
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55e5256adf3940e71802e2f749cacf81518726b0
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/707c2dc77891a874f4e8c52c285a511079164ec8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de41ee24f77b0fc45397db3e277cae2adbd43dfe
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e0fa5ea434b7e8467ef3adc64e3858b1ca2a642d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2829ae5459ddb5fce526b2e84697edf6c0c3cef
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: conntrack: avoid modifying shared unconfirmed ct entry In a case where skb with an unconfirmed ct entry gets cloned, we may end up committing both but with different sets of extensions. The series of events: 1. The first clone wants to commit and runs the helpers wiring up the extension pointer into the expectation list. 2. Then it looses the confirmation keeping the entry unconfirmed. 3. Second clone now wants to commit labels and adds the new extension for that breaking the pointer in the expectation list causing UAF on the destruction path later. While this is possible to trigger, there should be no practical network pipeline where committing both clones without modifications into the same zone is needed. So, let's just reset the entry in case for some reason we got an skb with a shared one during commit. This doesn't affect any known use cases, but avoids any potential problems with sharing a...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: conntrack: avoid modifying shared unconfirmed ct entry In a case where skb with an unconfirmed ct entry gets cloned, we may end up committing both but with different sets of extensions. The series of events: 1. The first clone wants to commit and runs the helpers wiring up the extension pointer into the expectation list. 2. Then it looses the confirmation keeping the entry unconfirmed. 3. Second clone now wants to commit labels and adds the new extension for that breaking the pointer in the expectation list causing UAF on the destruction path later. While this is possible to trigger, there should be no practical network pipeline where committing both clones without modifications into the same zone is needed. So, let's just reset the entry in case for some reason we got an skb with a shared one during commit. This doesn't affect any known use cases, but avoids any potential problems with sharing a...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: conntrack: avoid modifying shared unconfirmed ct entry In a case where skb with an unconfirmed ct entry gets cloned, we may end up committing both but with different sets of extensions. The series of events: 1. The first clone wants to commit and runs the helpers wiring up the extension pointer into the expectation list. 2. Then it looses the confirmation keeping the entry unconfirmed. 3. Second clone now wants to commit labels and adds the new extension for that breaking the pointer in the expectation list causing UAF on the destruction path later. While this is possible to trigger, there should be no practical network pipeline where committing both clones without modifications into the same zone is needed. So, let's just reset the entry in case for some reason we got an skb with a shared one during commit. This doesn't affect any known use cases, but avoids any potential proble
net: openvswitch: conntrack: avoid modifying shared unconfirmed ct entry
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: n ...