Описание
kkFileView >= 4.2.0 is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). The cross-origin file proxy endpoint /getCorsFile is protected by TrustHostFilter against the trust.host whitelist. However, the URL parameter validated by the filter is not the same parameter the controller actually fetches: the filter validates the first non-empty parameter in a fixed priority order, while the controller only reads and fetches urlPath. By supplying both urlPath= and url= in the same request, the decoy passes validation while the unvalidated real target is fetched server-side — and the response body is echoed back to the attacker.
kkFileView >= 4.2.0 is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). The cross-origin file proxy endpoint /getCorsFile is protected by TrustHostFilter against the trust.host whitelist. However, the URL parameter validated by the filter is not the same parameter the controller actually fetches: the filter validates the first non-empty parameter in a fixed priority order, while the controller only reads and fetches urlPath. By supplying both urlPath= and url= in the same request, the decoy passes validation while the unvalidated real target is fetched server-side — and the response body is echoed back to the attacker.
Связанные уязвимости
kkFileView >= 4.2.0 is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). The cross-origin file proxy endpoint /getCorsFile is protected by TrustHostFilter against the trust.host whitelist. However, the URL parameter validated by the filter is not the same parameter the controller actually fetches: the filter validates the first non-empty parameter in a fixed priority order, while the controller only reads and fetches urlPath. By supplying both urlPath=<real target> and url=<whitelisted decoy address> in the same request, the decoy passes validation while the unvalidated real target is fetched server-side — and the response body is echoed back to the attacker.
kkFileView >= 4.2.0 is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF ...