Описание
A flaw was found in rhacm versions before 2.0.5 and before 2.1.0. Two internal service APIs were incorrectly provisioned using a test certificate from the source repository. This would result in all installations using the same certificates. If an attacker could observe network traffic internal to a cluster, they could use the private key to decode API requests that should be protected by TLS sessions, potentially obtaining information they would not otherwise be able to. These certificates are not used for service authentication, so no opportunity for impersonation or active MITM attacks were made possible.
A flaw was found in rhacm versions before 2.0.5 and before 2.1.0. Two internal service APIs were incorrectly provisioned using a test certificate from the source repository. This would result in all installations using the same certificates. If an attacker could observe network traffic internal to a cluster, they could use the private key to decode API requests that should be protected by TLS sessions, potentially obtaining information they would not otherwise be able to. These certificates are not used for service authentication, so no opportunity for impersonation or active MITM attacks were made possible.
Связанные уязвимости
A flaw was found in rhacm versions before 2.0.5 and before 2.1.0. Two internal service APIs were incorrectly provisioned using a test certificate from the source repository. This would result in all installations using the same certificates. If an attacker could observe network traffic internal to a cluster, they could use the private key to decode API requests that should be protected by TLS sessions, potentially obtaining information they would not otherwise be able to. These certificates are not used for service authentication, so no opportunity for impersonation or active MITM attacks were made possible.
A flaw was found in rhacm versions before 2.0.5 and before 2.1.0. Two internal service APIs were incorrectly provisioned using a test certificate from the source repository. This would result in all installations using the same certificates. If an attacker could observe network traffic internal to a cluster, they could use the private key to decode API requests that should be protected by TLS sessions, potentially obtaining information they would not otherwise be able to. These certificates are not used for service authentication, so no opportunity for impersonation or active MITM attacks were made possible.