Описание
bpf: Prevent tail call between progs attached to different hooks
FAQ
Is Azure Linux the only Microsoft product that includes this open-source library and is therefore potentially affected by this vulnerability?
One of the main benefits to our customers who choose to use the Azure Linux distro is the commitment to keep it up to date with the most recent and most secure versions of the open source libraries with which the distro is composed. Microsoft is committed to transparency in this work which is why we began publishing CSAF/VEX in October 2025. See this blog post for more information. If impact to additional products is identified, we will update the CVE to reflect this.
EPSS
7.8 High
CVSS3
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Prevent tail call between progs attached to different hooks bpf progs can be attached to kernel functions, and the attached functions can take different parameters or return different return values. If prog attached to one kernel function tail calls prog attached to another kernel function, the ctx access or return value verification could be bypassed. For example, if prog1 is attached to func1 which takes only 1 parameter and prog2 is attached to func2 which takes two parameters. Since verifier assumes the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed based on func2's prototype, verifier allows prog2 to access the second parameter from the bpf ctx passed to it. The problem is that verifier does not prevent prog1 from passing its bpf ctx to prog2 via tail call. In this case, the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed from func1 instead of func2, that is, the assumption for ctx access verification is bypassed. Another ...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Prevent tail call between progs attached to different hooks bpf progs can be attached to kernel functions, and the attached functions can take different parameters or return different return values. If prog attached to one kernel function tail calls prog attached to another kernel function, the ctx access or return value verification could be bypassed. For example, if prog1 is attached to func1 which takes only 1 parameter and prog2 is attached to func2 which takes two parameters. Since verifier assumes the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed based on func2's prototype, verifier allows prog2 to access the second parameter from the bpf ctx passed to it. The problem is that verifier does not prevent prog1 from passing its bpf ctx to prog2 via tail call. In this case, the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed from func1 instead of func2, that is, the assumption for ctx access verification is bypassed. Another ...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Prevent tail call between progs attached to different hooks bpf progs can be attached to kernel functions, and the attached functions can take different parameters or return different return values. If prog attached to one kernel function tail calls prog attached to another kernel function, the ctx access or return value verification could be bypassed. For example, if prog1 is attached to func1 which takes only 1 parameter and prog2 is attached to func2 which takes two parameters. Since verifier assumes the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed based on func2's prototype, verifier allows prog2 to access the second parameter from the bpf ctx passed to it. The problem is that verifier does not prevent prog1 from passing its bpf ctx to prog2 via tail call. In this case, the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed from func1 instead of func2, that is, the assumption for ctx access verification is bypassed. Another
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: b ...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Prevent tail call between progs attached to different hooks bpf progs can be attached to kernel functions, and the attached functions can take different parameters or return different return values. If prog attached to one kernel function tail calls prog attached to another kernel function, the ctx access or return value verification could be bypassed. For example, if prog1 is attached to func1 which takes only 1 parameter and prog2 is attached to func2 which takes two parameters. Since verifier assumes the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed based on func2's prototype, verifier allows prog2 to access the second parameter from the bpf ctx passed to it. The problem is that verifier does not prevent prog1 from passing its bpf ctx to prog2 via tail call. In this case, the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed from func1 instead of func2, that is, the assumption for ctx access verification is bypassed. Anot...
EPSS
7.8 High
CVSS3