Описание
secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map
FAQ
Is Azure Linux the only Microsoft product that includes this open-source library and is therefore potentially affected by this vulnerability?
One of the main benefits to our customers who choose to use the Azure Linux distro is the commitment to keep it up to date with the most recent and most secure versions of the open source libraries with which the distro is composed. Microsoft is committed to transparency in this work which is why we began publishing CSAF/VEX in October 2025. See this blog post for more information. If impact to additional products is identified, we will update the CVE to reflect this.
EPSS
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map(). This is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking 4k PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map is set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's break-before-make semantics do not easily allow breaking apart large/gigantic pages). More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(), set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success (0) instead of an error. This means that memfd_secret will seemingly "work" (e.g. syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages), but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from the direct map. Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with CONFIG_RODATA_FULL...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map(). This is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking 4k PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map is set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's break-before-make semantics do not easily allow breaking apart large/gigantic pages). More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(), set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success (0) instead of an error. This means that memfd_secret will seemingly "work" (e.g. syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages), but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from the direct map. Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with CONFIG_RODATA_FULL...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map(). This is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking 4k PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map is set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's break-before-make semantics do not easily allow breaking apart large/gigantic pages). More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(), set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success (0) instead of an error. This means that memfd_secret will seemingly "work" (e.g. syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages), but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from the direct map. Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with CONFIG_RODATA_FUL
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s ...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map(). This is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking 4k PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map is set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's break-before-make semantics do not easily allow breaking apart large/gigantic pages). More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(), set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success (0) instead of an error. This means that memfd_secret will seemingly "work" (e.g. syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages), but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from the direct map. Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with CONFIG_RODATA_...
EPSS