Описание
bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage
FAQ
Is Azure Linux the only Microsoft product that includes this open-source library and is therefore potentially affected by this vulnerability?
One of the main benefits to our customers who choose to use the Azure Linux distro is the commitment to keep it up to date with the most recent and most secure versions of the open source libraries with which the distro is composed. Microsoft is committed to transparency in this work which is why we began publishing CSAF/VEX in October 2025. See this blog post for more information. If impact to additional products is identified, we will update the CVE to reflect this.
EPSS
7.1 High
CVSS3
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage Lonial reported that an out-of-bounds access in cgroup local storage can be crafted via tail calls. Given two programs each utilizing a cgroup local storage with a different value size, and one program doing a tail call into the other. The verifier will validate each of the indivial programs just fine. However, in the runtime context the bpf_cg_run_ctx holds an bpf_prog_array_item which contains the BPF program as well as any cgroup local storage flavor the program uses. Helpers such as bpf_get_local_storage() pick this up from the runtime context: ctx = container_of(current->bpf_ctx, struct bpf_cg_run_ctx, run_ctx); storage = ctx->prog_item->cgroup_storage[stype]; if (stype == BPF_CGROUP_STORAGE_SHARED) ptr = &READ_ONCE(storage->buf)->data[0]; else ptr = this_cpu_ptr(storage->percpu_buf); For the second program which was called from the originally attached one, this means...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage Lonial reported that an out-of-bounds access in cgroup local storage can be crafted via tail calls. Given two programs each utilizing a cgroup local storage with a different value size, and one program doing a tail call into the other. The verifier will validate each of the indivial programs just fine. However, in the runtime context the bpf_cg_run_ctx holds an bpf_prog_array_item which contains the BPF program as well as any cgroup local storage flavor the program uses. Helpers such as bpf_get_local_storage() pick this up from the runtime context: ctx = container_of(current->bpf_ctx, struct bpf_cg_run_ctx, run_ctx); storage = ctx->prog_item->cgroup_storage[stype]; if (stype == BPF_CGROUP_STORAGE_SHARED) ptr = &READ_ONCE(storage->buf)->data[0]; else ptr = this_cpu_ptr(storage->percpu_buf); For the second program which was called from the originally attached one, this means...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage Lonial reported that an out-of-bounds access in cgroup local storage can be crafted via tail calls. Given two programs each utilizing a cgroup local storage with a different value size, and one program doing a tail call into the other. The verifier will validate each of the indivial programs just fine. However, in the runtime context the bpf_cg_run_ctx holds an bpf_prog_array_item which contains the BPF program as well as any cgroup local storage flavor the program uses. Helpers such as bpf_get_local_storage() pick this up from the runtime context: ctx = container_of(current->bpf_ctx, struct bpf_cg_run_ctx, run_ctx); storage = ctx->prog_item->cgroup_storage[stype]; if (stype == BPF_CGROUP_STORAGE_SHARED) ptr = &READ_ONCE(storage->buf)->data[0]; else ptr = this_cpu_ptr(storage->percpu_buf); For the second program which was called from the originally attach
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: b ...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage Lonial reported that an out-of-bounds access in cgroup local storage can be crafted via tail calls. Given two programs each utilizing a cgroup local storage with a different value size, and one program doing a tail call into the other. The verifier will validate each of the indivial programs just fine. However, in the runtime context the bpf_cg_run_ctx holds an bpf_prog_array_item which contains the BPF program as well as any cgroup local storage flavor the program uses. Helpers such as bpf_get_local_storage() pick this up from the runtime context: ctx = container_of(current->bpf_ctx, struct bpf_cg_run_ctx, run_ctx); storage = ctx->prog_item->cgroup_storage[stype]; if (stype == BPF_CGROUP_STORAGE_SHARED) ptr = &READ_ONCE(storage->buf)->data[0]; else ptr = this_cpu_ptr(storage->percpu_buf); For the second program which was called from the originally att...
EPSS
7.1 High
CVSS3