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CVE-2026-90251

Опубликовано: 19 сент. 2026
Источник: msrc
CVSS3: 6.1
EPSS Низкий

Описание

Bluetooth: MSFT: validate evt_prefix_len against the response length

Обновления

ПродуктСтатьяОбновление
azl3 kernel 6.6.150.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0

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EPSS

Процентиль: 12%
0.0021
Низкий

6.1 Medium

CVSS3

Связанные уязвимости

ubuntu
4 дня назад

(In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: B ...)

nvd
4 дня назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MSFT: validate evt_prefix_len against the response length read_supported_features() only checks that the response covers the fixed part of struct msft_rp_read_supported_features, which is 11 bytes: if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) { bt_dev_err(hdev, "MSFT supported features length mismatch"); goto failed; } evt_prefix[] is a flexible array member and rp->evt_prefix_len is an unvalidated u8 taken straight out of that response, so msft->evt_prefix = kmemdup(rp->evt_prefix, rp->evt_prefix_len, GFP_KERNEL); copies up to 255 bytes from a reply that may have carried none of them. What is copied is data the controller never sent, and it is then used to match incoming vendor events in msft_vendor_evt(). This is not an out-of-bounds access. An skb data allocation always has at least SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info)) bytes past the payload, which is more than the 255 byte maximum, so the r

debian
4 дня назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: B ...

github
4 дня назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MSFT: validate evt_prefix_len against the response length read_supported_features() only checks that the response covers the fixed part of struct msft_rp_read_supported_features, which is 11 bytes: if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) { bt_dev_err(hdev, "MSFT supported features length mismatch"); goto failed; } evt_prefix[] is a flexible array member and rp->evt_prefix_len is an unvalidated u8 taken straight out of that response, so msft->evt_prefix = kmemdup(rp->evt_prefix, rp->evt_prefix_len, GFP_KERNEL); copies up to 255 bytes from a reply that may have carried none of them. What is copied is data the controller never sent, and it is then used to match incoming vendor events in msft_vendor_evt(). This is not an out-of-bounds access. An skb data allocation always has at least SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info)) bytes past the payload, which is more than the 255 byte maximum, so th...

EPSS

Процентиль: 12%
0.0021
Низкий

6.1 Medium

CVSS3