Логотип exploitDog
Консоль
Логотип exploitDog

exploitDog

msrc логотип

CVE-2026-99296

Опубликовано: 19 нояб. 2026
Источник: msrc
CVSS3: 6.5
EPSS Низкий

Описание

libceph: bound mon_command ack decode to front len

EPSS

Процентиль: 11%
0.00209
Низкий

6.5 Medium

CVSS3

Связанные уязвимости

ubuntu
4 дня назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound mon_command ack decode to front len handle_command_ack() bounds the decode with msg->front_alloc_len, the size of the reply buffer, instead of msg->front.iov_len, the number of bytes the monitor sent. mon_alloc_msg() routes every CEPH_MSG_MON_COMMAND_ACK to get_generic_reply(), which returns the preallocated ->reply of whichever generic request carries the same tid, so the buffer keeps its fixed size however short the reply is. An ack with hdr.front_len below sizeof(struct ceph_mon_request_header) + sizeof(u32), including 0, still passes ceph_decode_need(), and ceph_decode_32() returns four bytes that were never received: uninitialized slab memory, stale bytes of an earlier message, or bytes the peer planted by sending a reply that lands in the same buffer and is then rejected. The read stays within the allocation, so KASAN does not flag it. req->result reaches userspace through ceph_monc_do_statfs...

CVSS3: 5.9
redhat
4 дня назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound mon_command ack decode to front len handle_command_ack() bounds the decode with msg->front_alloc_len, the size of the reply buffer, instead of msg->front.iov_len, the number of bytes the monitor sent. mon_alloc_msg() routes every CEPH_MSG_MON_COMMAND_ACK to get_generic_reply(), which returns the preallocated ->reply of whichever generic request carries the same tid, so the buffer keeps its fixed size however short the reply is. An ack with hdr.front_len below sizeof(struct ceph_mon_request_header) + sizeof(u32), including 0, still passes ceph_decode_need(), and ceph_decode_32() returns four bytes that were never received: uninitialized slab memory, stale bytes of an earlier message, or bytes the peer planted by sending a reply that lands in the same buffer and is then rejected. The read stays within the allocation, so KASAN does not flag it. req->result reaches userspace through ceph_monc_do_statfs...

nvd
4 дня назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound mon_command ack decode to front len handle_command_ack() bounds the decode with msg->front_alloc_len, the size of the reply buffer, instead of msg->front.iov_len, the number of bytes the monitor sent. mon_alloc_msg() routes every CEPH_MSG_MON_COMMAND_ACK to get_generic_reply(), which returns the preallocated ->reply of whichever generic request carries the same tid, so the buffer keeps its fixed size however short the reply is. An ack with hdr.front_len below sizeof(struct ceph_mon_request_header) + sizeof(u32), including 0, still passes ceph_decode_need(), and ceph_decode_32() returns four bytes that were never received: uninitialized slab memory, stale bytes of an earlier message, or bytes the peer planted by sending a reply that lands in the same buffer and is then rejected. The read stays within the allocation, so KASAN does not flag it. req->result reaches userspace through ceph_monc_do_statfs

debian
4 дня назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: l ...

github
4 дня назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound mon_command ack decode to front len handle_command_ack() bounds the decode with msg->front_alloc_len, the size of the reply buffer, instead of msg->front.iov_len, the number of bytes the monitor sent. mon_alloc_msg() routes every CEPH_MSG_MON_COMMAND_ACK to get_generic_reply(), which returns the preallocated ->reply of whichever generic request carries the same tid, so the buffer keeps its fixed size however short the reply is. An ack with hdr.front_len below sizeof(struct ceph_mon_request_header) + sizeof(u32), including 0, still passes ceph_decode_need(), and ceph_decode_32() returns four bytes that were never received: uninitialized slab memory, stale bytes of an earlier message, or bytes the peer planted by sending a reply that lands in the same buffer and is then rejected. The read stays within the allocation, so KASAN does not flag it. req->result reaches userspace through ceph_monc_do_sta...

EPSS

Процентиль: 11%
0.00209
Низкий

6.5 Medium

CVSS3