Описание
The ngtcp2 project is an effort to implement IETF QUIC protocol in C. In affected versions acks are not validated before being written to the qlog leading to a buffer overflow. In ngtcp2_conn::conn_recv_pkt for an ACK, there was new logic that got added to skip conn_recv_ack if an ack has already been processed in the payload. However, this causes us to also skip ngtcp2_pkt_validate_ack. The ack which was skipped still got written to qlog. The bug occurs in ngtcp2_qlog::write_ack_frame. It is now possible to reach this code with an invalid ack, suppose largest_ack=0 and first_ack_range=15. Subtracting largest_ack - first_ack_range will lead to an integer underflow which is 20 chars long. However, the ngtcp2 qlog code assumes the number written is a signed integer and only accounts for 19 characters of overhead (see NGTCP2_QLOG_ACK_FRAME_RANGE_OVERHEAD). Therefore, we overwrite the buffer causing a heap overflow. This is high priority and could potentially impact many us
EPSS
8.2 High
CVSS3
Дефекты
Связанные уязвимости
The ngtcp2 project is an effort to implement IETF QUIC protocol in C. In affected versions acks are not validated before being written to the qlog leading to a buffer overflow. In `ngtcp2_conn::conn_recv_pkt` for an ACK, there was new logic that got added to skip `conn_recv_ack` if an ack has already been processed in the payload. However, this causes us to also skip `ngtcp2_pkt_validate_ack`. The ack which was skipped still got written to qlog. The bug occurs in `ngtcp2_qlog::write_ack_frame`. It is now possible to reach this code with an invalid ack, suppose `largest_ack=0` and `first_ack_range=15`. Subtracting `largest_ack - first_ack_range` will lead to an integer underflow which is 20 chars long. However, the ngtcp2 qlog code assumes the number written is a signed integer and only accounts for 19 characters of overhead (see `NGTCP2_QLOG_ACK_FRAME_RANGE_OVERHEAD`). Therefore, we overwrite the buffer causing a heap overflow. This is high priority and could potentially impact many...
The ngtcp2 project is an effort to implement IETF QUIC protocol in C. In affected versions acks are not validated before being written to the qlog leading to a buffer overflow. In `ngtcp2_conn::conn_recv_pkt` for an ACK, there was new logic that got added to skip `conn_recv_ack` if an ack has already been processed in the payload. However, this causes us to also skip `ngtcp2_pkt_validate_ack`. The ack which was skipped still got written to qlog. The bug occurs in `ngtcp2_qlog::write_ack_frame`. It is now possible to reach this code with an invalid ack, suppose `largest_ack=0` and `first_ack_range=15`. Subtracting `largest_ack - first_ack_range` will lead to an integer underflow which is 20 chars long. However, the ngtcp2 qlog code assumes the number written is a signed integer and only accounts for 19 characters of overhead (see `NGTCP2_QLOG_ACK_FRAME_RANGE_OVERHEAD`). Therefore, we overwrite the buffer causing a heap overflow. This is high priority and could potentially impact many...
The ngtcp2 project is an effort to implement IETF QUIC protocol in C. ...
Уязвимость реализации протокола QUIC и HTTP/3 на языке C пакета NGTCP2, связанная с реализацией некорректного потока управления, позволяющая нарушителю выполнить произвольный код
EPSS
8.2 High
CVSS3