CVE-2026-64533

CVE-2026-64533

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: validate lcns_follow in log_replay conversion log_replay() converts DIR_PAGE_ENTRY_32 records into DIR_PAGE_ENTRY records when replaying version 0 restart tables. During this conversion, the memmove() length is derived directly from the on-disk lcns_follow field: memmove(&dp->vcn, &dp0->vcn_low, 2 * sizeof(u64) + le32_to_cpu(dp->lcns_follow) * sizeof(u64)); check_rstbl() validates restart table structure, but does not constrain per-entry lcns_follow values relative to the entry size. A malformed filesystem image can provide an oversized lcns_follow value, causing the conversion memmove() to access memory beyond the bounds of the allocated restart table buffer. The same field is later used to bound iteration over page_lcns[], so validating lcns_follow during conversion also prevents downstream out-of-bounds access from the same malformed metadata. Compute the maximum valid lcns_follow from the already-valid...

CVE-2026-64533

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's ntfs3 filesystem driver. A local attacker could exploit this vulnerability by crafting a specially designed NTFS filesystem image. This flaw allows an attacker to cause an out-of-bounds memory write during the log replay conversion process, potentially leading to memory corruption and system instability or denial of service.

CVE-2026-64533

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f ...

GHSA-hvv2-rwwx-6q3h

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: validate lcns_follow in log_replay conversion log_replay() converts DIR_PAGE_ENTRY_32 records into DIR_PAGE_ENTRY records when replaying version 0 restart tables. During this conversion, the memmove() length is derived directly from the on-disk lcns_follow field: memmove(&dp->vcn, &dp0->vcn_low, 2 * sizeof(u64) + le32_to_cpu(dp->lcns_follow) * sizeof(u64)); check_rstbl() validates restart table structure, but does not constrain per-entry lcns_follow values relative to the entry size. A malformed filesystem image can provide an oversized lcns_follow value, causing the conversion memmove() to access memory beyond the bounds of the allocated restart table buffer. The same field is later used to bound iteration over page_lcns[], so validating lcns_follow during conversion also prevents downstream out-of-bounds access from the same malformed metadata. Compute the maximum valid lcns_follow from the...