Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix stack buffer overflow in multichannel session-key copy Commit 4b706360ffb7 ("ksmbd: fix multichannel binding and enforce channel limit") moved the binding-path session key out of the session-wide sess->sess_key (CIFS_KEY_SIZE = 40) into a new per-channel buffer, and sized both that buffer and the on-stack copy used during binding with SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE (16): struct channel { char sess_key[SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE]; /* 16 */ ... }; ntlm_authenticate() / krb5_authenticate(): char channel_key[SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE] = {}; /* 16 */ char *auth_key = conn->binding ? channel_key : sess->sess_key; The two writers that fill this destination still bound the copy length against CIFS_KEY_SIZE (40), not against the 16-byte buffer: ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() (NTLM key exchange): if (sess_key_len > CIFS_KEY_SIZE) /* 40 */ return -EINVAL; arc4_crypt(ctx_arc4, sess_key, (char *)authblob + sess_key_off, sess...
A flaw was found in ksmbd in the Linux kernel. A stack buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the multichannel session-key copy mechanism. A remote attacker can exploit this by supplying a crafted session key larger than the intended buffer size during a binding session setup. This can lead to a kernel stack overflow, potentially allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix stack buffer overflow in multichannel session-key copy Commit 4b706360ffb7 ("ksmbd: fix multichannel binding and enforce channel limit") moved the binding-path session key out of the session-wide sess->sess_key (CIFS_KEY_SIZE = 40) into a new per-channel buffer, and sized both that buffer and the on-stack copy used during binding with SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE (16): struct channel { char sess_key[SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE]; /* 16 */ ... }; ntlm_authenticate() / krb5_authenticate(): char channel_key[SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE] = {}; /* 16 */ char *auth_key = conn->binding ? channel_key : sess->sess_key; The two writers that fill this destination still bound the copy length against CIFS_KEY_SIZE (40), not against the 16-byte buffer: ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() (NTLM key exchange): if (sess_key_len > CIFS_KEY_SIZE) /* 40 */ return -EINVAL; arc4_crypt(ctx_arc4, sess_key, (char ...