Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: zero the FS_OBJECT_ID_INFORMATION buffer before filling it in
smb2_get_info_filesystem() reports 64 bytes for FS_OBJECT_ID_INFORMATION, that is the whole of struct object_id_info, but writes only 46 of them:
- objid[] is 16 bytes, and when the volume UUID is not available only sizeof(stfs.f_fsid) (8) bytes are copied into it;
- extended_info.version_string[] is STRING_LENGTH (28) bytes, and only strlen("1.1.0") (5) bytes are copied into it.
The response buffer is zeroed on allocation (kvzalloc() in smb2_allocate_rsp_buf()), so for a standalone request the remaining 31 bytes are zero. In a compound request they need not be. The offset of the next response is advanced by the length pinned for the previous one, so if a preceding command wrote its reply into the buffer and then failed, smb2_set_err_rsp() pins only the short error response and the next reply lands inside the area that has already been w
Ссылки
EPSS
Дефекты
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: zero the FS_OBJECT_ID_INFORMATION buffer before filling it in smb2_get_info_filesystem() reports 64 bytes for FS_OBJECT_ID_INFORMATION, that is the whole of struct object_id_info, but writes only 46 of them: - objid[] is 16 bytes, and when the volume UUID is not available only sizeof(stfs.f_fsid) (8) bytes are copied into it; - extended_info.version_string[] is STRING_LENGTH (28) bytes, and only strlen("1.1.0") (5) bytes are copied into it. The response buffer is zeroed on allocation (kvzalloc() in smb2_allocate_rsp_buf()), so for a standalone request the remaining 31 bytes are zero. In a compound request they need not be. The offset of the next response is advanced by the length pinned for the previous one, so if a preceding command wrote its reply into the buffer and then failed, smb2_set_err_rsp() pins only the short error response and the next reply lands inside the area that has already been written. ...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: zero the FS_OBJECT_ID_INFORMATION buffer before filling it in smb2_get_info_filesystem() reports 64 bytes for FS_OBJECT_ID_INFORMATION, that is the whole of struct object_id_info, but writes only 46 of them: - objid[] is 16 bytes, and when the volume UUID is not available only sizeof(stfs.f_fsid) (8) bytes are copied into it; - extended_info.version_string[] is STRING_LENGTH (28) bytes, and only strlen("1.1.0") (5) bytes are copied into it. The response buffer is zeroed on allocation (kvzalloc() in smb2_allocate_rsp_buf()), so for a standalone request the remaining 31 bytes are zero. In a compound request they need not be. The offset of the next response is advanced by the length pinned for the previous one, so if a preceding command wrote its reply into the buffer and then failed, smb2_set_err_rsp() pins only the short error response and the next reply lands inside the area that has already been written. ...
ksmbd: zero the FS_OBJECT_ID_INFORMATION buffer before filling it in
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: k ...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: zero the FS_OBJECT_ID_INFORMATION buffer before filling it in smb2_get_info_filesystem() reports 64 bytes for FS_OBJECT_ID_INFORMATION, that is the whole of struct object_id_info, but writes only 46 of them: - objid[] is 16 bytes, and when the volume UUID is not available only sizeof(stfs.f_fsid) (8) bytes are copied into it; - extended_info.version_string[] is STRING_LENGTH (28) bytes, and only strlen("1.1.0") (5) bytes are copied into it. The response buffer is zeroed on allocation (kvzalloc() in smb2_allocate_rsp_buf()), so for a standalone request the remaining 31 bytes are zero. In a compound request they need not be. The offset of the next response is advanced by the length pinned for the previous one, so if a preceding command wrote its reply into the buffer and then failed, smb2_set_err_rsp() pins only the short error response and the next reply lands inside the area that has already bee...
EPSS