Описание
Once an user is authenticated on Jolokia, he can potentially trigger arbitrary code execution. In details, in ActiveMQ configurations, jetty allows org.jolokia.http.AgentServlet to handler request to /api/jolokia org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#handlePostRequest is able to create JmxRequest through JSONObject. And calls to org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#executeRequest. Into deeper calling stacks, org.jolokia.handler.ExecHandler#doHandleRequest can be invoked through refection. This could lead to RCE through via various mbeans. One example is unrestricted deserialization in jdk.management.jfr.FlightRecorderMXBeanImpl which exists on Java version above 11. 1 Call newRecording. 2 Call setConfiguration. And a webshell data hides in it. 3 Call startRecording. 4 Call copyTo method. The webshell will be written to a .jsp file. The mitigation is to restrict (by default) the actions authorized on Jolokia, or disable Jolokia. A more restrictive Jolokia configuration has been defined in default ActiveMQ distribution. We encourage users to upgrade to ActiveMQ distributions version including updated Jolokia configuration: 5.16.6, 5.17.4, 5.18.0, 6.0.0.
Отчет
This vulnerability is considered moderate severity due to the requirement of authenticated access to exploit the flaw, significantly reducing the risk to systems that enforce strong authentication controls. While it does allow for remote code execution through Jolokia's request handling and Java Management Extensions (JMX), the exploitation pathway is complex and relies on specific conditions, such as the presence of Java 11 or higher and misconfigured or permissive Jolokia settings. an authenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution (RCE) within the ActiveMQ environment.Only an authenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution (RCE) within the ActiveMQ environment. In environments where authentication is well-managed and Jolokia is correctly configured or disabled, the likelihood of successful exploitation is reduced, mitigating the overall impact on system security.
Меры по смягчению последствий
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability.
Затронутые пакеты
| Платформа | Пакет | Состояние | Рекомендация | Релиз |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A-MQ Clients 2 | activemq | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat build of Apache Camel for Spring Boot 4 | activemq | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat build of OptaPlanner 8 | activemq | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Data Grid 8 | activemq | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Integration Camel K 1 | activemq | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat JBoss Data Grid 7 | activemq | Out of support scope | ||
| Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7 | activemq | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 8 | activemq | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat JBoss Fuse 6 | activemq | Out of support scope | ||
| Red Hat JBoss Fuse Service Works 6 | activemq | Out of support scope |
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Дополнительная информация
Статус:
EPSS
7.5 High
CVSS3
Связанные уязвимости
Once an user is authenticated on Jolokia, he can potentially trigger arbitrary code execution. In details, in ActiveMQ configurations, jetty allows org.jolokia.http.AgentServlet to handler request to /api/jolokia org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#handlePostRequest is able to create JmxRequest through JSONObject. And calls to org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#executeRequest. Into deeper calling stacks, org.jolokia.handler.ExecHandler#doHandleRequest can be invoked through refection. This could lead to RCE through via various mbeans. One example is unrestricted deserialization in jdk.management.jfr.FlightRecorderMXBeanImpl which exists on Java version above 11. 1 Call newRecording. 2 Call setConfiguration. And a webshell data hides in it. 3 Call startRecording. 4 Call copyTo method. The webshell will be written to a .jsp file. The mitigation is to restrict (by default) the actions authorized on Jolokia, or disable Jolokia. A more restrictive Jolokia configuration has been defined ...
Once an user is authenticated on Jolokia, he can potentially trigger arbitrary code execution. In details, in ActiveMQ configurations, jetty allows org.jolokia.http.AgentServlet to handler request to /api/jolokia org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#handlePostRequest is able to create JmxRequest through JSONObject. And calls to org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#executeRequest. Into deeper calling stacks, org.jolokia.handler.ExecHandler#doHandleRequest can be invoked through refection. This could lead to RCE through via various mbeans. One example is unrestricted deserialization in jdk.management.jfr.FlightRecorderMXBeanImpl which exists on Java version above 11. 1 Call newRecording. 2 Call setConfiguration. And a webshell data hides in it. 3 Call startRecording. 4 Call copyTo method. The webshell will be written to a .jsp file. The mitigation is to restrict (by default) the actions authorized on Jolokia, or disable Jolokia. A more restrictive Jolokia configuration has been d
Once an user is authenticated on Jolokia, he can potentially trigger a ...
Apache ActiveMQ Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability
EPSS
7.5 High
CVSS3