Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/qaic: tighten bounds checking in decode_message() Copy the bounds checking from encode_message() to decode_message(). This patch addresses the following concerns. Ensure that there is enough space for at least one header so that we don't have a negative size later. if (msg_hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr)) Ensure that we have enough space to read the next header from the msg->data. if (msg_len > msg_hdr_len - sizeof(*trans_hdr)) return -EINVAL; Check that the trans_hdr->len is not below the minimum size: if (hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr)) This minimum check ensures that we don't corrupt memory in decode_passthrough() when we do. memcpy(out_trans->data, in_trans->data, len - sizeof(in_trans->hdr)); And finally, use size_add() to prevent an integer overflow: if (size_add(msg_len, hdr_len) > msg_hdr_len)
Затронутые пакеты
| Платформа | Пакет | Состояние | Рекомендация | Релиз |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 | kernel-rt | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | kernel-rt | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | kernel-rt | Not affected |
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Дополнительная информация
EPSS
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/qaic: tighten bounds checking in decode_message() Copy the bounds checking from encode_message() to decode_message(). This patch addresses the following concerns. Ensure that there is enough space for at least one header so that we don't have a negative size later. if (msg_hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr)) Ensure that we have enough space to read the next header from the msg->data. if (msg_len > msg_hdr_len - sizeof(*trans_hdr)) return -EINVAL; Check that the trans_hdr->len is not below the minimum size: if (hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr)) This minimum check ensures that we don't corrupt memory in decode_passthrough() when we do. memcpy(out_trans->data, in_trans->data, len - sizeof(in_trans->hdr)); And finally, use size_add() to prevent an integer overflow: if (size_add(msg_len, hdr_len) > msg_hdr_len)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/qaic: tighten bounds checking in decode_message() Copy the bounds checking from encode_message() to decode_message(). This patch addresses the following concerns. Ensure that there is enough space for at least one header so that we don't have a negative size later. if (msg_hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr)) Ensure that we have enough space to read the next header from the msg->data. if (msg_len > msg_hdr_len - sizeof(*trans_hdr)) return -EINVAL; Check that the trans_hdr->len is not below the minimum size: if (hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr)) This minimum check ensures that we don't corrupt memory in decode_passthrough() when we do. memcpy(out_trans->data, in_trans->data, len - sizeof(in_trans->hdr)); And finally, use size_add() to prevent an integer overflow: if (size_add(msg_len, hdr_len) > msg_hdr_len)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: a ...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/qaic: tighten bounds checking in decode_message() Copy the bounds checking from encode_message() to decode_message(). This patch addresses the following concerns. Ensure that there is enough space for at least one header so that we don't have a negative size later. if (msg_hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr)) Ensure that we have enough space to read the next header from the msg->data. if (msg_len > msg_hdr_len - sizeof(*trans_hdr)) return -EINVAL; Check that the trans_hdr->len is not below the minimum size: if (hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr)) This minimum check ensures that we don't corrupt memory in decode_passthrough() when we do. memcpy(out_trans->data, in_trans->data, len - sizeof(in_trans->hdr)); And finally, use size_add() to prevent an integer overflow: if (size_add(msg_len, hdr_len) > msg_hdr_len)
Уязвимость функции decode_message() ядра операционной системы Linux, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании
EPSS