Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user. It comes from process_responses(). On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) + sizeof(struct rss_header)" addition could have an integer wrapping bug. Use size_add() to prevent this.
Затронутые пакеты
| Платформа | Пакет | Состояние | Рекомендация | Релиз |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 | kernel | Fix deferred | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 | kernel | Out of support scope | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 | kernel | Out of support scope | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 | kernel-rt | Out of support scope | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | kernel | Out of support scope | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | kernel-rt | Out of support scope | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | kernel | Fix deferred | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | kernel-rt | Fix deferred |
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Дополнительная информация
Статус:
4.4 Medium
CVSS3
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user. It comes from process_responses(). On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) + sizeof(struct rss_header)" addition could have an integer wrapping bug. Use size_add() to prevent this.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user. It comes from process_responses(). On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) + sizeof(struct rss_header)" addition could have an integer wrapping bug. Use size_add() to prevent this.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: r ...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user. It comes from process_responses(). On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) + sizeof(struct rss_header)" addition could have an integer wrapping bug. Use size_add() to prevent this.
4.4 Medium
CVSS3