Описание
A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in KubeVirt's virt-api port-forward handler. When processing a port-forward request to a VirtualMachineInstance (VMI), virt-api reads the target IP from vmi.Status.Interfaces[0].IP and passes it directly to net.Dial() without validation. For VMIs using non-masquerade network bindings (bridge or secondary-only), this IP is reported by the QEMU guest agent running inside the VM and is fully controllable by the VM owner. An attacker with kubevirt.io:edit permissions can create a VM with a modified guest agent that reports an arbitrary IP address, then request port-forward to establish a bidirectional TCP tunnel from virt-api's cluster-internal network position to any routable destination, bypassing NetworkPolicy isolation.
Отчет
Red Hat has rated this issue as Moderate impact. Only VMs configured with bridge binding or secondary-only network interfaces (which require a cluster administrator to have created a NetworkAttachmentDefinition) are affected.
Меры по смягчению последствий
Users who do not use bridge binding or secondary-only network interfaces for their VMs are not affected by this vulnerability. For environments using these configurations, cluster administrators can apply egress NetworkPolicy to the openshift-cnv namespace to restrict virt-api's outbound connections to known-legitimate destinations (launcher pod CIDRs and node IPs), which blocks the SSRF to arbitrary targets.
Затронутые пакеты
| Платформа | Пакет | Состояние | Рекомендация | Релиз |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat OpenShift Virtualization 4 | container-native-virtualization/virt-api | Fix deferred | ||
| Red Hat OpenShift Virtualization 4 | container-native-virtualization/virt-api-rhel9 | Fix deferred |
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Дополнительная информация
Статус:
EPSS
6.4 Medium
CVSS3
Связанные уязвимости
A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in KubeVirt's virt-api port-forward handler. When processing a port-forward request to a VirtualMachineInstance (VMI), virt-api reads the target IP from vmi.Status.Interfaces[0].IP and passes it directly to net.Dial() without validation. For VMIs using non-masquerade network bindings (bridge or secondary-only), this IP is reported by the QEMU guest agent running inside the VM and is fully controllable by the VM owner. An attacker with kubevirt.io:edit permissions can create a VM with a modified guest agent that reports an arbitrary IP address, then request port-forward to establish a bidirectional TCP tunnel from virt-api's cluster-internal network position to any routable destination, bypassing NetworkPolicy isolation.
Virt-api-rhel9: kubevirt: kubevirt: ssrf in virt-api port-forward via unvalidated guest-agent-reported ip
A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in KubeVirt's virt-api port-forward handler. When processing a port-forward request to a VirtualMachineInstance (VMI), virt-api reads the target IP from vmi.Status.Interfaces[0].IP and passes it directly to net.Dial() without validation. For VMIs using non-masquerade network bindings (bridge or secondary-only), this IP is reported by the QEMU guest agent running inside the VM and is fully controllable by the VM owner. An attacker with kubevirt.io:edit permissions can create a VM with a modified guest agent that reports an arbitrary IP address, then request port-forward to establish a bidirectional TCP tunnel from virt-api's cluster-internal network position to any routable destination, bypassing NetworkPolicy isolation.
EPSS
6.4 Medium
CVSS3