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CVE-2026-17349

Опубликовано: 31 июл. 2026
Источник: redhat
CVSS3: 9.6

Описание

/misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server, part of the Workspaces feature introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.0, when passed the id of an existing server, clones that server via Server.clone(), which copies every column from the source row, including user_id, shared, shared_username, and the stored credential fields password, save_password, and tunnel_password. When a non-owner triggered an adhoc connect against another user's (in practice, typically an administrator's) shared server, the clone inherited that user's ownership, shared flag, and stored database credentials verbatim. pgAdmin persisted this cross-tenant, credential-bearing server row before the connection was even attempted, so it survived even when the connection subsequently failed. The non-owner could then open the newly-owned clone and pgAdmin would connect using the source user's stored database password on the non-owner's behalf, granting the non-owner use of database credentials -- and whatever database privileges they confer -- that were never their own. Fix forces the cloned adhoc record's ownership fields (user_id, shared, shared_username) and stored credential fields (password, save_password, tunnel_password) to belong to the calling user and be cleared/private before committing, regardless of the source server's ownership, sharing state, or stored credentials. A regression test asserts that an adhoc connect triggered by a non-owner against another user's shared server persists a row owned by the caller, not shared, and without the source's stored credentials. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 9.0 before 9.17.

A flaw was found in pgAdmin 4. An authenticated, low-privilege user could exploit a vulnerability in the adhoc server cloning feature to gain unauthorized access to another user's stored database credentials. By initiating an adhoc connection to a shared server owned by another user, the cloning process would inadvertently copy the owner's database password and associated privileges. This allows the attacker to connect to databases with the privileges of the original owner, leading to significant information disclosure and potential data manipulation.

Отчет

This flaw only affects the Fedora community project and does not affect Red Hat products.

Дополнительная информация

Статус:

Critical
Дефект:
CWE-639
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2509833pgadmin4: pgAdmin 4: Unauthorized database credential access via adhoc server cloning

9.6 Critical

CVSS3

Связанные уязвимости

CVSS3: 9.6
nvd
17 дней назад

/misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server, part of the Workspaces feature introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.0, when passed the id of an existing server, clones that server via Server.clone(), which copies every column from the source row, including user_id, shared, shared_username, and the stored credential fields password, save_password, and tunnel_password. When a non-owner triggered an adhoc connect against another user's (in practice, typically an administrator's) shared server, the clone inherited that user's ownership, shared flag, and stored database credentials verbatim. pgAdmin persisted this cross-tenant, credential-bearing server row before the connection was even attempted, so it survived even when the connection subsequently failed. The non-owner could then open the newly-owned clone and pgAdmin would connect using the source user's stored database password on the non-owner's behalf, granting the non-owner use of database credentials -- and whatever database privileges they confer -- t

CVSS3: 9.6
debian
17 дней назад

/misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server, part of the Workspaces feature i ...

CVSS3: 9.6
github
17 дней назад

/misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server, part of the Workspaces feature introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.0, when passed the id of an existing server, clones that server via Server.clone(), which copies every column from the source row, including user_id, shared, shared_username, and the stored credential fields password, save_password, and tunnel_password. When a non-owner triggered an adhoc connect against another user's (in practice, typically an administrator's) shared server, the clone inherited that user's ownership, shared flag, and stored database credentials verbatim. pgAdmin persisted this cross-tenant, credential-bearing server row before the connection was even attempted, so it survived even when the connection subsequently failed. The non-owner could then open the newly-owned clone and pgAdmin would connect using the source user's stored database password on the non-owner's behalf, granting the non-owner use of database credentials -- and whatever database privileges they confer -...

9.6 Critical

CVSS3