Описание
The non-blocking (asynchronous) JSON parser in jackson-core does not enforce the maxNumberLength constraint defined in StreamReadConstraints (default: 1000 characters). An attacker able to submit JSON to an application that uses the async parser API can supply a number token of arbitrary length, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a denial of service.
The synchronous parser enforces this limit correctly, so the constraint is applied inconsistently depending on which parsing API the application uses.
Root cause: the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase and related classes never invokes the number length validation methods. Number parsing methods such as _finishNumberIntegralPart() accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length check, then call _valueComplete() to finalize the token. _valueComplete() does not call resetInt() or resetFloat(), which are the methods in ParserBase where validateIntegerLength() and validateFPLength() are performed. Because that validation step is skipped, maxNumberLength is never enforced on the async code path.
Impact: an attacker sending a JSON document containing an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (for example a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application) can cause unbounded allocation in the TextBuffer and an OutOfMemoryError. If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM may additionally be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing, causing CPU-based denial of service.
No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required.
This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from version 2.15.0 through 2.18.5 and from 2.19.0 through 2.21.0, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0 through 3.0.x.
Versions prior to 2.15.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints -- which defines the maxNumberLength setting -- was first introduced in jackson-core 2.15.0, so no such constraint exists to be bypassed in earlier releases. Note that GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq records the lower bound of the affected 2.x range as 2.0.0.
A flaw was found in jackson-core. The non-blocking (asynchronous) JSON parser does not properly enforce the maximum number length constraint. A remote attacker can exploit this by submitting a specially crafted JSON document containing an arbitrarily long number to an application using the asynchronous parser. This can lead to excessive memory allocation and CPU exhaustion, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) for the affected application.
Отчет
Red Hat's assessment of this vulnerability differs from the reported vendor severity. The flaw exists only in jackson-core's non-blocking (asynchronous) JSON parser, which does not enforce the maxNumberLength constraint defined by StreamReadConstraints. Applications that use the standard, synchronous parsing API (the default for the vast majority of Java applications using jackson-core, including via ObjectMapper) enforce this limit correctly and are not affected by this specific code path. Only applications that explicitly invoke the non-blocking parser API, typically reactive frameworks processing untrusted network input, are exposed to the described memory/CPU exhaustion behavior. Red Hat rates this issue as Moderate.
Меры по смягчению последствий
No mitigation is available for applications that use the non-blocking/async parser API with untrusted input. Affected users should upgrade to jackson-core 2.18.6, 2.21.1, 3.1.0, or later. Applications that only use the standard (synchronous) parser API are not affected and require no action.
Затронутые пакеты
| Платформа | Пакет | Состояние | Рекомендация | Релиз |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cryostat 4 | jackson-core | Not affected | ||
| OpenShift Developer Tools and Services | jenkins | Out of support scope | ||
| OpenShift Developer Tools and Services | jenkins-2-plugins | Out of support scope | ||
| OpenShift Developer Tools and Services | ocp-tools-4/jenkins-rhel8 | Not affected | ||
| OpenShift Developer Tools and Services | ocp-tools-4/jenkins-rhel9 | Not affected | ||
| OpenShift Serverless | openshift-serverless-1/kn-ekb-dispatcher-rhel9 | Fix deferred | ||
| OpenShift Serverless | openshift-serverless-1/kn-ekb-receiver-rhel9 | Fix deferred | ||
| OpenShift Serverless | openshift-serverless-1/kn-eventing-integrations-aws-ddb-streams-source-rhel9 | Fix deferred | ||
| OpenShift Serverless | openshift-serverless-1/kn-eventing-integrations-aws-s3-sink-rhel9 | Fix deferred | ||
| OpenShift Serverless | openshift-serverless-1/kn-eventing-integrations-aws-s3-source-rhel9 | Fix deferred |
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Дополнительная информация
Статус:
EPSS
5.3 Medium
CVSS3
Связанные уязвимости
The non-blocking (asynchronous) JSON parser in jackson-core does not enforce the maxNumberLength constraint defined in StreamReadConstraints (default: 1000 characters). An attacker able to submit JSON to an application that uses the async parser API can supply a number token of arbitrary length, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a denial of service. The synchronous parser enforces this limit correctly, so the constraint is applied inconsistently depending on which parsing API the application uses. Root cause: the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase and related classes never invokes the number length validation methods. Number parsing methods such as _finishNumberIntegralPart() accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length check, then call _valueComplete() to finalize the token. _valueComplete() does not call resetInt() or resetFloat(), which are the methods in ParserBase where validateIntegerLength() and vali...
The non-blocking (asynchronous) JSON parser in jackson-core does not enforce the maxNumberLength constraint defined in StreamReadConstraints (default: 1000 characters). An attacker able to submit JSON to an application that uses the async parser API can supply a number token of arbitrary length, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a denial of service. The synchronous parser enforces this limit correctly, so the constraint is applied inconsistently depending on which parsing API the application uses. Root cause: the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase and related classes never invokes the number length validation methods. Number parsing methods such as _finishNumberIntegralPart() accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length check, then call _valueComplete() to finalize the token. _valueComplete() does not call resetInt() or resetFloat(), which are the methods in ParserBase where validateIntegerLength() and v
The non-blocking (asynchronous) JSON parser in jackson-core does not e ...
The non-blocking (asynchronous) JSON parser in jackson-core does not enforce the maxNumberLength constraint defined in StreamReadConstraints (default: 1000 characters). An attacker able to submit JSON to an application that uses the async parser API can supply a number token of arbitrary length, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a denial of service. The synchronous parser enforces this limit correctly, so the constraint is applied inconsistently depending on which parsing API the application uses. Root cause: the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase and related classes never invokes the number length validation methods. Number parsing methods such as _finishNumberIntegralPart() accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length check, then call _valueComplete() to finalize the token. _valueComplete() does not call resetInt() or resetFloat(), which are the methods in ParserBase where validateIntegerLength() an...
EPSS
5.3 Medium
CVSS3