Описание
The Verify() method for FIDO/U2F security key types (sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com) did not check the User Presence flag. Signatures generated without physical touch were accepted, allowing unattended use of a hardware security key. To restore the previous behavior, return a "no-touch-required" extension in Permissions.Extensions from PublicKeyCallback.
A flaw was found in golang.org/x/crypto/ssh. The Verify() method, responsible for FIDO/U2F security key types, did not properly check for user presence. This allowed signatures to be accepted without requiring a physical touch on the hardware security key. As a result, an attacker could potentially use a hardware security key in an unattended manner, bypassing a critical security control designed to ensure user intent.
Затронутые пакеты
| Платформа | Пакет | Состояние | Рекомендация | Релиз |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assisted Installer for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 2 | assisted/agent-preinstall-image-builder-rhel9 | Affected | ||
| Builds for Red Hat OpenShift | openshift-builds/openshift-builds-controller-rhel9 | Affected | ||
| Builds for Red Hat OpenShift | openshift-builds/openshift-builds-git-cloner-rhel9 | Affected | ||
| Builds for Red Hat OpenShift | openshift-builds/openshift-builds-image-bundler-rhel9 | Affected | ||
| Builds for Red Hat OpenShift | openshift-builds/openshift-builds-image-processing-rhel9 | Affected | ||
| Builds for Red Hat OpenShift | openshift-builds/openshift-builds-waiters-rhel9 | Affected | ||
| Builds for Red Hat OpenShift | openshift-builds/openshift-builds-webhook-rhel9 | Affected | ||
| cert-manager Operator for Red Hat OpenShift | cert-manager/jetstack-cert-manager-acmesolver-rhel9 | Affected | ||
| cert-manager Operator for Red Hat OpenShift | cert-manager/jetstack-cert-manager-rhel9 | Affected | ||
| Confidential Compute Attestation | openshift-sandboxed-containers/osc-cloud-api-adaptor-rhel9 | Affected |
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Дополнительная информация
Статус:
EPSS
8.1 High
CVSS3
Связанные уязвимости
The Verify() method for FIDO/U2F security key types (sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com) did not check the User Presence flag. Signatures generated without physical touch were accepted, allowing unattended use of a hardware security key. To restore the previous behavior, return a "no-touch-required" extension in Permissions.Extensions from PublicKeyCallback.
The Verify() method for FIDO/U2F security key types (sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com, sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com) did not check the User Presence flag. Signatures generated without physical touch were accepted, allowing unattended use of a hardware security key. To restore the previous behavior, return a "no-touch-required" extension in Permissions.Extensions from PublicKeyCallback.
Invoking bypass of FIDO/U2F security keys physical interaction in golang.org/x/crypto/ssh
The Verify() method for FIDO/U2F security key types (sk-ecdsa-sha2-nis ...
EPSS
8.1 High
CVSS3