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CVE-2026-44894

Опубликовано: 12 июн. 2026
Источник: redhat
CVSS3: 7.5

Описание

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when the application does not set one. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, its writeToken() returns false (server will not send Retry — acceptable), but validateToken() unconditionally return 0. In QuicheQuicServerCodec.handlePacket(), a non-negative return from validateToken() is interpreted as 'token is valid, ODCID starts at offset 0', causing the server to call quiche_accept as if the client's address had been validated by a Retry round-trip. Per RFC 9000 §8.1, a validated address lifts the 3× anti-amplification send limit. Thus any attacker who includes ANY non-empty token bytes in an Initial packet — with a spoofed victim source IP — causes the Netty server to treat the victim as validated and reflect full-size handshake flights (certificates, etc.) toward it without the 3× cap. The correct 'no token handler' semantics would be to return -1 (invalid) so the normal un-validated path and amplification limit apply. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue.

A flaw was found in Netty, specifically within the netty-codec-classes-quic component's NoQuicTokenHandler. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending an Initial packet with any non-empty token bytes and a spoofed victim's IP address. This improper token validation causes the Netty server to bypass the 3x anti-amplification send limit, treating the victim as validated. As a result, the server reflects full-size handshake flights towards the spoofed victim, leading to an amplification attack.

Меры по смягчению последствий

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability.

Затронутые пакеты

ПлатформаПакетСостояниеРекомендацияРелиз
Red Hat build of Apache Camel - HawtIO 4netty-codec-classes-quicAffected

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Дополнительная информация

Статус:

Important
Дефект:
CWE-346
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2488380netty-codec-classes-quic: Netty: Denial of Service amplification via improper QUIC token validation

7.5 High

CVSS3

Связанные уязвимости

CVSS3: 7.5
ubuntu
около 2 месяцев назад

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when the application does not set one. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, its writeToken() returns false (server will not send Retry — acceptable), but validateToken() unconditionally `return 0`. In QuicheQuicServerCodec.handlePacket(), a non-negative return from validateToken() is interpreted as 'token is valid, ODCID starts at offset 0', causing the server to call quiche_accept as if the client's address had been validated by a Retry round-trip. Per RFC 9000 §8.1, a validated address lifts the 3× anti-amplification send limit. Thus any attacker who includes ANY non-empty token bytes in an Initial packet — with a spoofed victim source IP — causes the Netty server to treat the victim as validated and reflect full-size handshake flights (certificates, etc.) toward it without the 3× cap. The correct 'no token handler' semantics would be to return -...

CVSS3: 7.5
nvd
около 2 месяцев назад

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when the application does not set one. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, its writeToken() returns false (server will not send Retry — acceptable), but validateToken() unconditionally `return 0`. In QuicheQuicServerCodec.handlePacket(), a non-negative return from validateToken() is interpreted as 'token is valid, ODCID starts at offset 0', causing the server to call quiche_accept as if the client's address had been validated by a Retry round-trip. Per RFC 9000 §8.1, a validated address lifts the 3× anti-amplification send limit. Thus any attacker who includes ANY non-empty token bytes in an Initial packet — with a spoofed victim source IP — causes the Netty server to treat the victim as validated and reflect full-size handshake flights (certificates, etc.) toward it without the 3× cap. The correct 'no token handler' semantics would be to return -1 (

CVSS3: 7.5
debian
около 2 месяцев назад

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol s ...

CVSS3: 7.5
github
2 месяца назад

Netty's Default QUIC token handler accepts any client-supplied token

7.5 High

CVSS3