Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/v3d: Reject empty multisync extension to prevent infinite loop
v3d_get_extensions() walks a userspace-provided singly-linked list of
ioctl extensions without any bound on the chain length. A local user
can craft a self-referential extension (ext->next == &ext) with zero
in_sync_count and out_sync_count, which bypasses the existing duplicate-
extension guard:
if (se->in_sync_count || se->out_sync_count)
return -EINVAL;
The guard never fires because v3d_get_multisync_post_deps() returns
immediately when count is zero, leaving both fields at zero on every
iteration. The result is an infinite loop in kernel context, blocking
the calling thread and pegging a CPU core indefinitely.
Fix this by rejecting a multisync extension where both in_sync_count
and out_sync_count are zero in v3d_get_multisync_submit_deps(). An
empty multisync carries no synchronization information and serves no
useful purpose, so returning -EINVAL for such an extension is the
correct defense against this attack vector.
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's drm/v3d component. A local user can exploit this vulnerability by crafting a self-referential multisync extension with zero synchronization counts. This bypasses existing guards, leading to an infinite loop within the kernel. The consequence is a Denial of Service (DoS), where the affected system's CPU core is indefinitely consumed, blocking the calling thread.
Затронутые пакеты
| Платформа | Пакет | Состояние | Рекомендация | Релиз |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 | kernel-rt | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | kernel-rt | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | kernel-rt | Not affected |
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Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/v3d: Reject empty multisync extension to prevent infinite loop v3d_get_extensions() walks a userspace-provided singly-linked list of ioctl extensions without any bound on the chain length. A local user can craft a self-referential extension (ext->next == &ext) with zero in_sync_count and out_sync_count, which bypasses the existing duplicate- extension guard: if (se->in_sync_count || se->out_sync_count) return -EINVAL; The guard never fires because v3d_get_multisync_post_deps() returns immediately when count is zero, leaving both fields at zero on every iteration. The result is an infinite loop in kernel context, blocking the calling thread and pegging a CPU core indefinitely. Fix this by rejecting a multisync extension where both in_sync_count and out_sync_count are zero in v3d_get_multisync_submit_deps(). An empty multisync carries no synchronization information and serves no useful purpose, so returning -EINVA...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/v3d: Reject empty multisync extension to prevent infinite loop v3d_get_extensions() walks a userspace-provided singly-linked list of ioctl extensions without any bound on the chain length. A local user can craft a self-referential extension (ext->next == &ext) with zero in_sync_count and out_sync_count, which bypasses the existing duplicate- extension guard: if (se->in_sync_count || se->out_sync_count) return -EINVAL; The guard never fires because v3d_get_multisync_post_deps() returns immediately when count is zero, leaving both fields at zero on every iteration. The result is an infinite loop in kernel context, blocking the calling thread and pegging a CPU core indefinitely. Fix this by rejecting a multisync extension where both in_sync_count and out_sync_count are zero in v3d_get_multisync_submit_deps(). An empty multisync carries no synchronization information and serves no useful purpose, s
drm/v3d: Reject empty multisync extension to prevent infinite loop
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: d ...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/v3d: Reject empty multisync extension to prevent infinite loop v3d_get_extensions() walks a userspace-provided singly-linked list of ioctl extensions without any bound on the chain length. A local user can craft a self-referential extension (ext->next == &ext) with zero in_sync_count and out_sync_count, which bypasses the existing duplicate- extension guard: if (se->in_sync_count || se->out_sync_count) return -EINVAL; The guard never fires because v3d_get_multisync_post_deps() returns immediately when count is zero, leaving both fields at zero on every iteration. The result is an infinite loop in kernel context, blocking the calling thread and pegging a CPU core indefinitely. Fix this by rejecting a multisync extension where both in_sync_count and out_sync_count are zero in v3d_get_multisync_submit_deps(). An empty multisync carries no synchronization information and serves no useful purpose...