Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ptrace: slightly saner 'get_dumpable()' logic
The 'dumpability' of a task is fundamentally about the memory image of
the task - the concept comes from whether it can core dump or not - and
makes no sense when you don't have an associated mm.
And almost all users do in fact use it only for the case where the task
has a mm pointer.
But we have one odd special case: ptrace_may_access() uses 'dumpable' to
check various other things entirely independently of the MM (typically
explicitly using flags like PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS). Including for
threads that no longer have a VM (and maybe never did, like most kernel
threads).
It's not what this flag was designed for, but it is what it is.
The ptrace code does check that the uid/gid matches, so you do have to
be uid-0 to see kernel thread details, but this means that the
traditional "drop capabilities" model doesn't make any difference for
this all.
Make it all make a bit more sense by saying that if you don't have a
MM pointer, we'll use a cached "last dumpability" flag if the thread
ever had a MM (it will be zero for kernel threads since it is never
set), and require a proper CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability to override.
A vulnerability was found in the Linux kernel that allows an unprivileged local user to read sensitive files normally restricted to the root user. The flaw occurs during process exit, where a brief window allows an attacker to intercept file access from a privileged process before it fully terminates. Successful exploitation may lead to the disclosure of sensitive data such as SSH host private keys or /etc/shadow contents.
Отчет
This is an Important flaw in the Linux kernel that allows a local unprivileged attacker to read root-owned files. The vulnerability arises from a race condition during process termination, enabling a brief window where sensitive data, such as SSH host private keys or /etc/shadow contents, can be disclosed. This could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information on affected Red Hat Enterprise Linux systems.
In OpenShift Container Platform 4, this flaw is rated Low. The default restricted-v2 Security Context Constraint (SCC) sets allowPrivilegeEscalation: false on all pods, which causes the kernel to ignore setuid file bits and prevents target binaries from opening privileged files, breaking the exploit chain entirely. Under non-default SCCs such as anyuid that permit privilege escalation, the vulnerability is constrained by PID and mount namespace isolation to the container's own filesystem. An attacker would only be able to access root-owned files already within the container, not host or cross-pod resources. In practice, containers rarely contain sensitive root-owned files that are not already accessible to the pod user through normal means.
Меры по смягчению последствий
See the security bulletin for a detailed mitigation procedure.
Затронутые пакеты
| Платформа | Пакет | Состояние | Рекомендация | Релиз |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 | kernel-rt | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 | rhcos | Fix deferred | ||
| NVIDIA for RHEL 10 | kernel | Fixed | RHSA-2026:19540 | 20.05.2026 |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 | kernel | Fixed | RHSA-2026:19569 | 20.05.2026 |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10.0 Extended Update Support | kernel | Fixed | RHSA-2026:20299 | 21.05.2026 |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | kernel-rt | Fixed | RHSA-2026:19664 | 20.05.2026 |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | kernel | Fixed | RHSA-2026:19666 | 20.05.2026 |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | kpatch-patch | Fixed | RHSA-2026:23470 | 04.06.2026 |
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Дополнительная информация
Статус:
EPSS
7.8 High
CVSS3
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ptrace: slightly saner 'get_dumpable()' logic The 'dumpability' of a task is fundamentally about the memory image of the task - the concept comes from whether it can core dump or not - and makes no sense when you don't have an associated mm. And almost all users do in fact use it only for the case where the task has a mm pointer. But we have one odd special case: ptrace_may_access() uses 'dumpable' to check various other things entirely independently of the MM (typically explicitly using flags like PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS). Including for threads that no longer have a VM (and maybe never did, like most kernel threads). It's not what this flag was designed for, but it is what it is. The ptrace code does check that the uid/gid matches, so you do have to be uid-0 to see kernel thread details, but this means that the traditional "drop capabilities" model doesn't make any difference for this all. Make it all make a *bit...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ptrace: slightly saner 'get_dumpable()' logic The 'dumpability' of a task is fundamentally about the memory image of the task - the concept comes from whether it can core dump or not - and makes no sense when you don't have an associated mm. And almost all users do in fact use it only for the case where the task has a mm pointer. But we have one odd special case: ptrace_may_access() uses 'dumpable' to check various other things entirely independently of the MM (typically explicitly using flags like PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS). Including for threads that no longer have a VM (and maybe never did, like most kernel threads). It's not what this flag was designed for, but it is what it is. The ptrace code does check that the uid/gid matches, so you do have to be uid-0 to see kernel thread details, but this means that the traditional "drop capabilities" model doesn't make any difference for this all. Make it all make a
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: p ...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ptrace: slightly saner 'get_dumpable()' logic The 'dumpability' of a task is fundamentally about the memory image of the task - the concept comes from whether it can core dump or not - and makes no sense when you don't have an associated mm. And almost all users do in fact use it only for the case where the task has a mm pointer. But we have one odd special case: ptrace_may_access() uses 'dumpable' to check various other things entirely independently of the MM (typically explicitly using flags like PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS). Including for threads that no longer have a VM (and maybe never did, like most kernel threads). It's not what this flag was designed for, but it is what it is. The ptrace code does check that the uid/gid matches, so you do have to be uid-0 to see kernel thread details, but this means that the traditional "drop capabilities" model doesn't make any difference for this all. Make it all make...
EPSS
7.8 High
CVSS3