Описание
Improper Input Validation, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel ElasticSearch Rest Client.
The camel-elasticsearch-rest-client component reads several Exchange headers to control its behaviour - SEARCH_QUERY (an advanced query body), OPERATION (which Elasticsearch operation to run), INDEX_NAME, INDEX_SETTINGS and ID. The string values of these header constants, defined in ElasticSearchRestClientConstant, are plain unprefixed names ('SEARCH_QUERY', 'OPERATION', 'INDEX_NAME', 'INDEX_SETTINGS', 'ID') rather than the 'Camel'-prefixed names used by every other Camel component (for example CamelSqlQuery, CamelMongoDbCriteria, CamelCqlQuery). Camel's inbound HTTP header filter, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy, blocks only header names that begin with 'Camel' or 'camel'. Because the Elasticsearch header names do not carry that prefix, they pass through the inbound filter unchanged. When a Camel route exposes an HTTP entry point (for example platform-http) in front of an elasticsearch-rest-client producer, an untrusted HTTP client can set these headers directly on its request and override the query and operation that the route author configured: reading every document in the index (SEARCH_QUERY with a match_all query), deleting documents (OPERATION set to Delete together with ID), or exfiltrating selected fields. No credentials are required and the producer reads the headers unconditionally.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.3.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix renames the camel-elasticsearch-rest-client Exchange header constant string values (ID, SEARCH_QUERY, INDEX_SETTINGS, INDEX_NAME, OPERATION) to carry the Camel prefix (CamelElasticsearchId, CamelElasticsearchSearchQuery, CamelElasticsearchIndexSettings, CamelElasticsearchIndexName, CamelElasticsearchOperation) so that they are blocked by the inbound HttpHeaderFilterStrategy; the Java field names are unchanged. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the affected headers from untrusted inbound messages before they reach the producer (for example removeHeader('SEARCH_QUERY'), removeHeader('OPERATION'), removeHeader('INDEX_NAME'), removeHeader('INDEX_SETTINGS') and removeHeader('ID') in front of the elasticsearch-rest-client endpoint), or apply a custom HeaderFilterStrategy that blocks these names.
A flaw was found in the camel-elasticsearch-rest-client component of Apache Camel. An untrusted HTTP client can exploit this vulnerability by sending specific, unprefixed Exchange headers directly on its request when a Camel route exposes an HTTP entry point. This improper input validation allows the client to bypass authorization and override the intended Elasticsearch query and operation. Consequently, an attacker could read or delete documents, or exfiltrate selected fields from the Elasticsearch index without requiring credentials.
Отчет
Moderate: This flaw in Red Hat build of Apache Camel allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to bypass authorization and control Elasticsearch queries and operations. This is due to specific Exchange header constants in the camel-elasticsearch-rest-client component not being filtered by default when a Camel route exposes an HTTP entry point, leading to potential data exposure or modification.
Меры по смягчению последствий
To mitigate this issue, configure the Camel route to strip the vulnerable headers from untrusted inbound messages before they reach the elasticsearch-rest-client producer. This can be achieved by adding removeHeader('SEARCH_QUERY'), removeHeader('OPERATION'), removeHeader('INDEX_NAME'), removeHeader('INDEX_SETTINGS'), and removeHeader('ID') in front of the elasticsearch-rest-client endpoint in the Camel route. Alternatively, apply a custom HeaderFilterStrategy to block these specific header names.
Затронутые пакеты
| Платформа | Пакет | Состояние | Рекомендация | Релиз |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat build of Apache Camel for Spring Boot 4 | camel | Fix deferred |
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Дополнительная информация
Статус:
EPSS
5.3 Medium
CVSS3
Связанные уязвимости
Improper Input Validation, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel ElasticSearch Rest Client. The camel-elasticsearch-rest-client component reads several Exchange headers to control its behaviour - SEARCH_QUERY (an advanced query body), OPERATION (which Elasticsearch operation to run), INDEX_NAME, INDEX_SETTINGS and ID. The string values of these header constants, defined in ElasticSearchRestClientConstant, are plain unprefixed names ('SEARCH_QUERY', 'OPERATION', 'INDEX_NAME', 'INDEX_SETTINGS', 'ID') rather than the 'Camel'-prefixed names used by every other Camel component (for example CamelSqlQuery, CamelMongoDbCriteria, CamelCqlQuery). Camel's inbound HTTP header filter, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy, blocks only header names that begin with 'Camel' or 'camel'. Because the Elasticsearch header names do not carry that prefix, they pass through the inbound filter unchanged. When a Camel route exposes an HTTP entry point (for example platform-http) in
Apache Camel-Elasticsearch-Rest-Client: Exchange header constants without the Camel prefix bypass inbound HTTP header filtering, allowing untrusted clients to override the Elasticsearch query and operation
Уязвимость компонента camel-elasticsearch-rest-client java-фреймворка Apache Camel, позволяющая нарушителю обойти существующие механизмы безопасности
EPSS
5.3 Medium
CVSS3