Описание
In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.15.0 up to and including 1.25.1, the TLS server name used for DNS-over-TLS (DoT) forwarded queries is tied to a struct's ('serviced_query') lifetime but also referenced by another struct ('waiting_tcp'). When the owning struct is jostled out of the mesh while the DoT TCP stream is still handshaking it frees the storage behind the referenced string and if the TLS stream then errors out, it dereferences the freed pointer. The dereference is read-only and the practical impact is a daemon crash resulting in denial of service. A malicious actor that knows a DoT forwarding/stub Unbound's configuration could exploit the vulnerability by quering records in the appropriate zone while keeping Unbound uder pressure so that the jostle logic kicks in. If answers for the vulnerable zone are slow, the likelihood of jostling such queries is higher, although the timing of the jostle needs to be precise. Requirements for a vulnerable Unbound is the existence of a stub/forward zone configured for DoT together with a configured '#authname' suffix on the server identification. The connectivity to the server needs to exhibit a transient failure at the correct time in order to kick off the vulnerable error path.
A use-after-free flaw was found in Unbound's DNS-over-TLS (DoT) forwarded query handling. A remote attacker can exploit a timing error during TLS handshake failures on a server under load to trigger a daemon crash, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
Отчет
Unbound installations within Red Hat environments are vulnerable to a denial of service, leading to a daemon crash, only when specifically configured with DNS-over-TLS (DoT) forwarding or stub zones that include an #authname suffix. Exploitation by a remote attacker necessitates precise timing during transient network failures. Default Unbound configurations, which do not employ DoT forwarding or stub zones with #authname, are not affected. Hence, this is rated having low impact.
Меры по смягчению последствий
To mitigate this issue, avoid configuring Unbound with a #authname suffix in DNS-over-TLS (DoT) forwarding or stub zones if not strictly required. If the #authname suffix is necessary, restrict network access to the Unbound instance to trusted clients only. This may involve configuring firewall rules to limit inbound connections to the DoT port (typically 853) from known, secure sources. After modifying Unbound's configuration, the service must be reloaded or restarted for the changes to take effect. This action may temporarily interrupt DNS resolution services.
Затронутые пакеты
| Платформа | Пакет | Состояние | Рекомендация | Релиз |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 | unbound | Fix deferred | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 | unbound | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 | unbound | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | unbound | Fix deferred | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | unbound | Fix deferred | ||
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 | rhcos | Fix deferred | ||
| Red Hat Hardened Images | unbound-main-1.25.2-0.1.hum1 | Fixed | RHSA-2026:43588 | 22.07.2026 |
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Дополнительная информация
Статус:
3.7 Low
CVSS3
Связанные уязвимости
In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.15.0 up to and including 1.25.1, the TLS server name used for DNS-over-TLS (DoT) forwarded queries is tied to a struct's ('serviced_query') lifetime but also referenced by another struct ('waiting_tcp'). When the owning struct is jostled out of the mesh while the DoT TCP stream is still handshaking it frees the storage behind the referenced string and if the TLS stream then errors out, it dereferences the freed pointer. The dereference is read-only and the practical impact is a daemon crash resulting in denial of service. A malicious actor that knows a DoT forwarding/stub Unbound's configuration could exploit the vulnerability by quering records in the appropriate zone while keeping Unbound uder pressure so that the jostle logic kicks in. If answers for the vulnerable zone are slow, the likelihood of jostling such queries is higher, although the timing of the jostle needs to be precise. Requirements for a vulnerable Unbound is the existence of a stub/forward ...
In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.15.0 up to and including 1.25.1, the TLS server name used for DNS-over-TLS (DoT) forwarded queries is tied to a struct's ('serviced_query') lifetime but also referenced by another struct ('waiting_tcp'). When the owning struct is jostled out of the mesh while the DoT TCP stream is still handshaking it frees the storage behind the referenced string and if the TLS stream then errors out, it dereferences the freed pointer. The dereference is read-only and the practical impact is a daemon crash resulting in denial of service. A malicious actor that knows a DoT forwarding/stub Unbound's configuration could exploit the vulnerability by quering records in the appropriate zone while keeping Unbound uder pressure so that the jostle logic kicks in. If answers for the vulnerable zone are slow, the likelihood of jostling such queries is higher, although the timing of the jostle needs to be precise. Requirements for a vulnerable Unbound is the existence of a stub/forward zon
Possible heap use-after-free in an error path when a DoT forwarded query is jostled out
In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.15.0 up to and including 1.25.1, the TLS serve ...
In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.15.0 up to and including 1.25.1, the TLS server name used for DNS-over-TLS (DoT) forwarded queries is tied to a struct's ('serviced_query') lifetime but also referenced by another struct ('waiting_tcp'). When the owning struct is jostled out of the mesh while the DoT TCP stream is still handshaking it frees the storage behind the referenced string and if the TLS stream then errors out, it dereferences the freed pointer. The dereference is read-only and the practical impact is a daemon crash resulting in denial of service. A malicious actor that knows a DoT forwarding/stub Unbound's configuration could exploit the vulnerability by quering records in the appropriate zone while keeping Unbound uder pressure so that the jostle logic kicks in. If answers for the vulnerable zone are slow, the likelihood of jostling such queries is higher, although the timing of the jostle needs to be precise. Requirements for a vulnerable Unbound is the existence of a stub/forward ...
3.7 Low
CVSS3