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CVE-2026-63895

Опубликовано: 19 июл. 2026
Источник: redhat

Описание

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of how many bytes were actually received: data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); ... ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len); if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len))) ret = -EFAULT; __ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req->actual, which on a short control OUT transfer is strictly less than len. The copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer -- uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS daemon. Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs:

  • dwc2 continues on req->actual < req->length for ep0 DATA OUT (short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path).
  • aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len < ep->ep.maxpacket.
  • renesas_usbf logs "ep0 short packet" and completes the request.
  • dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT. A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is a normal condition f_fs has to cope with. The sibling gadgetfs implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does this correctly via min(len, dev->req->actual) before copy_to_user(). This patch brings f_fs.c to the same safe pattern rather than trimming at a defensive layer. The bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in real deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon (adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not reachable from unprivileged userspace. Linux host stacks normally reject short-wLength control OUTs before they reach the gadget, so reproducing this required a build that bypasses that host-side check. With the bypass in place, a 1-byte payload on a 64-byte Setup produces 63 bytes of non-canary slab residue in the daemon's read buffer. Fix by copying only ret (actually received) bytes to userspace.

    A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's FunctionFS (f_fs) driver. This vulnerability allows a privileged gadget daemon to receive uninitialized kernel memory (slab residue) due to incorrect handling of short USB control-OUT transfers. When ffs_ep0_read() processes a short control-OUT transfer, it copies more data than was actually received, exposing potentially sensitive information from the kernel's memory to the daemon. This information disclosure could lead to further exploitation.

Затронутые пакеты

ПлатформаПакетСостояниеРекомендацияРелиз
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10kernelNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6kernelNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7kernelNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7kernel-rtNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8kernelNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8kernel-rtNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9kernelNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9kernel-rtNot affected

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Дополнительная информация

Дефект:
CWE-125
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2502355kernel: usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read

Связанные уязвимости

ubuntu
14 дней назад

(In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: u ...)

nvd
15 дней назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of how many bytes were actually received: data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); ... ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len); if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len))) ret = -EFAULT; __ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req->actual, which on a short control OUT transfer is strictly less than len. The copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer -- uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS daemon. Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs: * dwc2 continues on req->actual < req->length for ep0 DATA OUT (

debian
15 дней назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: u ...

github
14 дней назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of how many bytes were actually received: data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); ... ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len); if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len))) ret = -EFAULT; __ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req->actual, which on a short control OUT transfer is strictly less than len. The copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer -- uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS daemon. Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs: * dwc2 continues on req->actual < req->length for ep0 DATA OUT ...