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CVE-2026-64273

Опубликовано: 25 июл. 2026
Источник: redhat
EPSS Низкий

Описание

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and using it to address the per-effect state array: i = data[1] & 0x7f; if (data[1] & 0x80) { if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) ... } else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) { ... } The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[] is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio / iforce_usb object. data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object. Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it. Bound against the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev->ff->max_effects so the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the device registered. A legitimate "effect started/stopped" status always carries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are unaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded and is left untouched.

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's iforce input driver. A malicious actor with a specially crafted input device could exploit an out-of-bounds write vulnerability by sending an unvalidated force-feedback effect index. This could allow the attacker to corrupt memory, potentially leading to system instability or other unpredictable behavior.

Затронутые пакеты

ПлатформаПакетСостояниеРекомендацияРелиз
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10kernelNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6kernelNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7kernelNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7kernel-rtNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8kernelNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8kernel-rtNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9kernelNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9kernel-rtNot affected

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Дополнительная информация

Статус:

Moderate
Дефект:
CWE-787
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2507199kernel: Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index

EPSS

Процентиль: 6%
0.00169
Низкий

Связанные уязвимости

CVSS3: 7.8
ubuntu
4 месяца назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and using it to address the per-effect state array: i = data[1] & 0x7f; if (data[1] & 0x80) { if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) ... } else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) { ... } The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[] is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio / iforce_usb object. data[1] is unvalidated device pay...

CVSS3: 7.8
nvd
4 месяца назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and using it to address the per-effect state array: i = data[1] & 0x7f; if (data[1] & 0x80) { if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) ... } else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) { ... } The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[] is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio / iforce_usb object.

msrc
3 месяца назад

Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index

CVSS3: 7.8
debian
4 месяца назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: I ...

CVSS3: 7.8
redos
около 1 месяца назад

Уязвимость kernel-lt

EPSS

Процентиль: 6%
0.00169
Низкий