Описание
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's HFS/HFS+ filesystem driver. An integer overflow vulnerability exists in the check_and_correct_requested_length function, where a calculation involving off + len can wrap around due to 32-bit arithmetic. This allows an attacker to bypass bounds checks, leading to an out-of-bounds read of approximately 4GB of memory. A local attacker with low privileges could exploit this to potentially disclose sensitive information or cause memory corruption.
Затронутые пакеты
| Платформа | Пакет | Состояние | Рекомендация | Релиз |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 | kernel-rt | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | kernel-rt | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | kernel-rt | Not affected |
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Дополнительная информация
EPSS
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length check_and_correct_requested_length() compares (off + len) against node_size using u32 arithmetic. When the caller passes a large len value (e.g. from an underflowed subtraction in hfs_brec_remove()), off + len can wrap past 2^32 and produce a small result, causing the bounds check to pass when it should fail. For example, with off=14 and len=0xFFFFFFF2 (underflowed from data_off - keyoffset - size in hfs_brec_remove), off + len wraps to 6, which is less than a typical node_size of 512, so the check passes and the subsequent memmove reads ~4GB past the node buffer. Fix this by widening the addition to u64 before comparing against node_size. This prevents the u32 wrap while keeping the logic straightforward.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length check_and_correct_requested_length() compares (off + len) against node_size using u32 arithmetic. When the caller passes a large len value (e.g. from an underflowed subtraction in hfs_brec_remove()), off + len can wrap past 2^32 and produce a small result, causing the bounds check to pass when it should fail. For example, with off=14 and len=0xFFFFFFF2 (underflowed from data_off - keyoffset - size in hfs_brec_remove), off + len wraps to 6, which is less than a typical node_size of 512, so the check passes and the subsequent memmove reads ~4GB past the node buffer. Fix this by widening the addition to u64 before comparing against node_size. This prevents the u32 wrap while keeping the logic straightforward.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: h ...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length check_and_correct_requested_length() compares (off + len) against node_size using u32 arithmetic. When the caller passes a large len value (e.g. from an underflowed subtraction in hfs_brec_remove()), off + len can wrap past 2^32 and produce a small result, causing the bounds check to pass when it should fail. For example, with off=14 and len=0xFFFFFFF2 (underflowed from data_off - keyoffset - size in hfs_brec_remove), off + len wraps to 6, which is less than a typical node_size of 512, so the check passes and the subsequent memmove reads ~4GB past the node buffer. Fix this by widening the addition to u64 before comparing against node_size. This prevents the u32 wrap while keeping the logic straightforward.
EPSS