Описание
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, 4.0.23, and 3.13.18, JWKS Fetch Ignores HTTP Response Status Code - Signing Key Destruction Causes Authentication DoS (CWE-252). the JWKS key fetching mechanism in uaajwt.erl does not validate the HTTP response status code when downloading signing keys from the OAuth2 provider's JWKS endpoint. Non-200 responses (including 4xx and 5xx errors) are processed identically to successful responses. When the JWKS endpoint returns an error response with a valid-JSON body that lacks a keys field, all previously cached signing keys are destroyed, causing a persistent authentication denial of Files: deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwt.erl, lines 50-63 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwks.erl, lines 5-7 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/rabbitoauth2provider.erl, lines 98-107 Bug 1: HTTP status code ignored (uaajwt.erl:50-63): The Erlang httpc module returns {ok, {{HttpVersion, StatusCode, ReasonPhrase}, Headers, Body}}. The pattern {ok, {, , JwksBody}} matches ANY successful HTTP transaction Persistent authentication DoS: Once keys are destroyed, ALL OAuth2/JWT authentication fails for all users until a new successful JWKS refresh occurs Amplification: A single attacker can deny access to all legitimate OAuth2 users across the entire RabbitMQ. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, 4.0.23, and 3.13.18.
A flaw was found in rabbitmq-server. When retrieving cryptographic signing keys from an identity provider's JSON Web Key Set (JWKS) endpoint, the server fails to validate HTTP response status codes. If an error response is returned with valid JSON lacking key data, all previously cached signing keys are purged. This allows an attacker to cause a persistent Denial of Service (DoS) by preventing all legitimate users from authenticating.
Отчет
A flaw was found in rabbitmq-server within the OAuth2 JWT authentication backend (uaajwt.erl). When querying an identity provider's JWKS endpoint for signing keys, the server fails to validate HTTP response status codes. An attacker capable of inducing or timing a JWKS fetch when the endpoint returns an HTTP error response containing valid JSON without a "keys" field causes the server to purge all cached signing keys. Consequently, all subsequent OAuth2/JWT authentication attempts fail, resulting in a persistent denial of service across the broker until valid keys are successfully refetched.
Меры по смягчению последствий
Disable the rabbitmq_auth_backend_oauth2 plugin and transition to internal username/password or mutual TLS (mTLS) authentication. Alternatively, place a reverse proxy in front of the JWKS endpoint to drop or sanitize non-200 HTTP responses before they reach RabbitMQ.
Затронутые пакеты
| Платформа | Пакет | Состояние | Рекомендация | Релиз |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Hardened Images | rabbitmq-server4.2 | Will not fix | ||
| Red Hat OpenStack Platform 13 (Queens) | rabbitmq-server | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat OpenStack Platform 16.2 | rabbitmq-server | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat OpenStack Platform 17.1 | rabbitmq-server | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat OpenStack Platform 18.0 | rabbitmq-server | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Hardened Images | rabbitmq-server4-3-main-4.3.6-1.hum1 | Fixed | RHSA-2026:67552 | 15.09.2026 |
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Ссылки на источники
Дополнительная информация
Статус:
EPSS
7.5 High
CVSS3
Связанные уязвимости
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, 4.0.23, and 3.13.18, JWKS Fetch Ignores HTTP Response Status Code - Signing Key Destruction Causes Authentication DoS (CWE-252). the JWKS key fetching mechanism in uaajwt.erl does not validate the HTTP response status code when downloading signing keys from the OAuth2 provider's JWKS endpoint. Non-200 responses (including 4xx and 5xx errors) are processed identically to successful responses. When the JWKS endpoint returns an error response with a valid-JSON body that lacks a keys field, all previously cached signing keys are destroyed, causing a persistent authentication denial of Files: deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwt.erl, lines 50-63 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwks.erl, lines 5-7 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/rabbitoauth2provider.erl, lines 98-107 Bug 1: HTTP status code ignored (uaajwt.erl:50-63): The Erlang httpc module returns {ok, {{HttpVersion, StatusCode, ReasonPhr...
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, 4.0.23, and 3.13.18, JWKS Fetch Ignores HTTP Response Status Code - Signing Key Destruction Causes Authentication DoS (CWE-252). the JWKS key fetching mechanism in uaajwt.erl does not validate the HTTP response status code when downloading signing keys from the OAuth2 provider's JWKS endpoint. Non-200 responses (including 4xx and 5xx errors) are processed identically to successful responses. When the JWKS endpoint returns an error response with a valid-JSON body that lacks a keys field, all previously cached signing keys are destroyed, causing a persistent authentication denial of Files: deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwt.erl, lines 50-63 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwks.erl, lines 5-7 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/rabbitoauth2provider.erl, lines 98-107 Bug 1: HTTP status code ignored (uaajwt.erl:50-63): The Erlang httpc module returns {ok, {{HttpVersion, StatusCode, ReasonPhrase
RabbitMQ: JWKS Fetch Ignores HTTP Response Status Code - Signing Key Destruction Causes Authentication DoS
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 4.3.3, ...
EPSS
7.5 High
CVSS3