CVE-2026-68266

Описание

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs An imported dma-buf BO is created as a ttm_bo_type_sg BO whose reservation object is the exporter's dma_buf->resv. The importer, however, only takes a dma-buf reference after a successful dma_buf_dynamic_attach(). Until then nothing keeps the exporter alive, so if the exporter is freed while the BO still references its resv, a later access to that resv is a use-after-free: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b9c Workqueue: ttm ttm_bo_delayed_delete [ttm] RIP: 0010:mutex_can_spin_on_owner+0x3f/0xc0 This can be reached on two paths:

• dma_buf_dynamic_attach() fails, or
• ttm_bo_init_reserved() fails during BO creation. In both cases the BO already has bo->base.resv pointing at the exporter resv, and sg BOs are always torn down via ttm_bo_delayed_delete(), which locks bo->base.resv asynchronously - potentially after the exporter has been freed. Take the dma-buf reference in xe_bo_init_locked(), before ttm_bo_init_reserved(), so it also covers a creation failure there, and release it in xe_ttm_bo_destroy(). The reference is held for the whole BO lifetime, keeping the shared resv alive on every path. v2:
• Reworked the fix to avoid creating the imported sg BO before dma_buf_dynamic_attach() succeeds.
• Attach with importer_priv == NULL and make invalidate_mappings ignore incomplete imports. v3:
• Dropped the xe-side reordering approach since importer_priv must be valid when dma_buf_dynamic_attach() publishes the attachment.
• Per Christian's suggestion on the v1 thread, keyed the check on import_attach rather than removing the sg guard entirely.
• Fixes both xe and amdgpu in a single TTM patch. v4:
• Moved import_attach check to after dma_resv_copy_fences() so fences are copied before returning for successful imports (Thomas).
• Removed exporter-alive claim from commit message (Thomas). v5:
• Add drm/xe patch to keep imported sg BOs off the LRU before attach succeeds; the TTM fix alone is not sufficient for xe if the BO is already LRU-visible. (Thomas) v4 patch: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/736663/?series=169129&rev=2
• Patch 1 (drm/ttm) carries Christian's Reviewed-by from v4. v6:
• Reworked the fix based on Thomas' suggestion. Instead of the TTM resv individualization (v1-v5) plus the xe off-LRU/placement handling (v5), just hold a dma-buf reference for the imported BO lifetime so the shared resv can never be freed while the BO still references it. Single xe patch, no TTM change. (Thomas)
• Take the reference in xe_bo_init_locked() before ttm_bo_init_reserved() so a TTM creation failure is covered too (Thomas).
• Dropped the v5 series (drm/ttm + drm/xe off-LRU); the off-LRU approach also regressed in CI BAT via ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting() creating a ghost BO that outlived the exporter. Link to v5: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/169984/ v7:
• Move changelog above --- so it stays in the commit message.
• Reorder changelog entries oldest-to-newest. (Thomas) (cherry picked from commit 3516f3fae6be35642f8f06f8a218da6425c0306a)
  
  A flaw was found in the drm/xe component of the Linux kernel. This vulnerability, a use-after-free, occurs because a dma-buf (Direct Memory Access Buffer) reference is not properly held for imported Buffer Objects (BOs). If the exporter of a dma-buf is freed while a BO still references its reservation object, a subsequent access can lead to a use-after-free condition. This can result in a system crash, causing a Denial of Service (DoS).