Описание
An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::MessageEncoder wrote a DNS label's length into a single octet without checking its range. A label longer than 255 octets had its length stored modulo 256 but the label data was written unchanged, and thus the bytes on the wire described a different name than the one the application asked to encode. RFC 1035 section 2.3.4 limits a label to 63 octets, and the two high bits of the length octet are reserved for compression pointers. put_string packed the length with put_pack("C", d.length) and put_label used it for labels, and thus any value from 0 to 255 could end up as a label length octet, including the reserved 0x40-0xBF range and the 0xC0-0xFF pointer range. Resolv::DNS::Name.create did not check per-label or total name length either, and thus an attacker-controlled hostname reached the encoder unchanged. An application that resolves an attacker-controlled hostname sends a query whose wire bytes name a domain the attacker chose. A hostname suffix that the application validates against an allowlist becomes padding that never appears on the wire, and thus allowlist and egress checks can be bypassed. The recursive resolver caches the response under the attacker's name, and DNS logs record that name rather than the one the application asked for. A label length whose low octet lands in the 0xC0-0xFF range produces a length octet that conforming parsers read as the start of a compression pointer, with the following attacker-controlled byte as the offset.
A flaw was found in the resolv gem. This vulnerability arises from the incorrect handling of DNS label lengths during message encoding. A remote attacker could exploit this by providing a specially crafted hostname to an application utilizing the resolv gem. This could lead to the bypass of security controls such as allowlists and egress checks, as well as DNS cache poisoning, where a recursive resolver caches an attacker-chosen name instead of the intended one. This also results in inaccurate DNS logs.
Отчет
This is a Moderate impact vulnerability in the Ruby resolv gem, which is part of the Ruby standard library. This flaw allows for DNS allowlist and egress bypass, and cache poisoning. When an application processes attacker-controlled hostnames, it can result in DNS queries for unintended domains, potentially circumventing network access restrictions or domain validation checks.
Меры по смягчению последствий
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.
Затронутые пакеты
| Платформа | Пакет | Состояние | Рекомендация | Релиз |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lightspeed Core | lightspeed-core/rag-tool-cpu-rhel9 | Fix deferred | ||
| Lightspeed Core | lightspeed-core/rag-tool-cuda-12.9-rhel9 | Fix deferred | ||
| Red Hat 3scale API Management Platform 2 | 3scale-amp2/backend-rhel8 | Out of support scope | ||
| Red Hat 3scale API Management Platform 2 | 3scale-amp2/toolbox-rhel9 | Out of support scope | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 | ruby | Fix deferred | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 | ruby4.0 | Fix deferred | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 | ruby | Out of support scope | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 | ruby | Fix deferred | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | ruby:2.5/ruby | Fix deferred | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | ruby:3.3/ruby | Fix deferred |
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Дополнительная информация
Статус:
4 Medium
CVSS3
Связанные уязвимости
An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::MessageEncoder wrote a DNS label's length into a single octet without checking its range. A label longer than 255 octets had its length stored modulo 256 but the label data was written unchanged, and thus the bytes on the wire described a different name than the one the application asked to encode. RFC 1035 section 2.3.4 limits a label to 63 octets, and the two high bits of the length octet are reserved for compression pointers. put_string packed the length with put_pack("C", d.length) and put_label used it for labels, and thus any value from 0 to 255 could end up as a label length octet, including the reserved 0x40-0xBF range and the 0xC0-0xFF pointer range. Resolv::DNS::Name.create did not check per-label or total name length either, and thus an attacker-controlled hostname reached the encoder unchanged. An application that resolves an attacker-controlled hostname sends a query whose wire bytes name a domai
An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::MessageEncoder wrote a DNS label's length into a single octet without checking its range. A label longer than 255 octets had its length stored modulo 256 but the label data was written unchanged, and thus the bytes on the wire described a different name than the one the application asked to encode. RFC 1035 section 2.3.4 limits a label to 63 octets, and the two high bits of the length octet are reserved for compression pointers. put_string packed the length with put_pack("C", d.length) and put_label used it for labels, and thus any value from 0 to 255 could end up as a label length octet, including the reserved 0x40-0xBF range and the 0xC0-0xFF pointer range. Resolv::DNS::Name.create did not check per-label or total name length either, and thus an attacker-controlled hostname reached the encoder unchanged. An application that resolves an attacker-controlled hostname sends a query whose wire bytes name a do...
4 Medium
CVSS3