Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i3c: master: svc: bound IBI payload to the requested max_payload_len
svc_i3c_master_handle_ibi() reads the IBI payload from the RX FIFO into
the IBI slot. The loop is bounded by the hardware FIFO size
(SVC_I3C_FIFO_SIZE), not by the slot size.
slot->data points into the IBI pool, which i3c_generic_ibi_alloc_pool()
sizes at max_payload_len per slot. svc_i3c_master_request_ibi() only
rejects a max_payload_len larger than SVC_I3C_FIFO_SIZE, so a driver can
request a smaller one. mctp-i3c requests 1. Each readsb() then copies the
controller RXCOUNT bytes (up to 31) with no check against the slot size.
A device that sends more bytes than the slot holds writes past
slot->data, an out-of-bounds write into the IBI pool.
Bound the loop by dev->ibi->max_payload_len and clamp each read to the
space left in the slot, the same way dw-i3c does. A device can still send
more than the requested payload. Flush the leftover bytes from the RX FIFO
so they do not leak into the next transfer.
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's I3C master driver. A malicious I3C device could exploit this by sending an In-Band Interrupt (IBI) payload that exceeds the allocated slot size. This can lead to an out-of-bounds write into the IBI pool, potentially causing memory corruption and system instability.
Отчет
This vulnerability is rated as Important because an out-of-bounds kernel memory write can lead to a system crash or arbitrary code execution with kernel privileges. Triggering the flaw requires physical access to an attached malicious device operating on an I3C bus managed by the Silvaco controller driver. Most enterprise Red Hat Enterprise Linux server and cloud environments do not utilize this specialized bus hardware, substantially limiting practical exposure across standard installations.
Меры по смягчению последствий
To mitigate this vulnerability, prevent the Silvaco I3C master controller driver module from loading:
- Blacklist the kernel module:
echo "blacklist svc-i3c-master" >> /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist-svc-i3c-master.conf
- Configure the module to fail loading if called directly or as a dependency:
echo "install svc-i3c-master /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist-svc-i3c-master.conf
Caveats: Disabling this module prevents the system from communicating with Silvaco I3C master hardware controllers and attached I3C peripherals. If the module is currently loaded, a system reboot is required to ensure it is completely unloaded from memory.
Затронутые пакеты
| Платформа | Пакет | Состояние | Рекомендация | Релиз |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 | kernel-rt | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | kernel | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | kernel-rt | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | kernel | Affected | ||
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | kernel-rt | Affected | ||
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 | openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8 | Not affected | ||
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 | openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9 | Affected | ||
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5 | openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9 | Affected |
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Дополнительная информация
Статус:
EPSS
7.8 High
CVSS3
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i3c: master: svc: bound IBI payload to the requested max_payload_len svc_i3c_master_handle_ibi() reads the IBI payload from the RX FIFO into the IBI slot. The loop is bounded by the hardware FIFO size (SVC_I3C_FIFO_SIZE), not by the slot size. slot->data points into the IBI pool, which i3c_generic_ibi_alloc_pool() sizes at max_payload_len per slot. svc_i3c_master_request_ibi() only rejects a max_payload_len larger than SVC_I3C_FIFO_SIZE, so a driver can request a smaller one. mctp-i3c requests 1. Each readsb() then copies the controller RXCOUNT bytes (up to 31) with no check against the slot size. A device that sends more bytes than the slot holds writes past slot->data, an out-of-bounds write into the IBI pool. Bound the loop by dev->ibi->max_payload_len and clamp each read to the space left in the slot, the same way dw-i3c does. A device can still send more than the requested payload. Flush the leftover bytes from...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i3c: master: svc: bound IBI payload to the requested max_payload_len svc_i3c_master_handle_ibi() reads the IBI payload from the RX FIFO into the IBI slot. The loop is bounded by the hardware FIFO size (SVC_I3C_FIFO_SIZE), not by the slot size. slot->data points into the IBI pool, which i3c_generic_ibi_alloc_pool() sizes at max_payload_len per slot. svc_i3c_master_request_ibi() only rejects a max_payload_len larger than SVC_I3C_FIFO_SIZE, so a driver can request a smaller one. mctp-i3c requests 1. Each readsb() then copies the controller RXCOUNT bytes (up to 31) with no check against the slot size. A device that sends more bytes than the slot holds writes past slot->data, an out-of-bounds write into the IBI pool. Bound the loop by dev->ibi->max_payload_len and clamp each read to the space left in the slot, the same way dw-i3c does. A device can still send more than the requested payload. Flush the leftover bytes fro
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i ...
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i3c: master: svc: bound IBI payload to the requested max_payload_len svc_i3c_master_handle_ibi() reads the IBI payload from the RX FIFO into the IBI slot. The loop is bounded by the hardware FIFO size (SVC_I3C_FIFO_SIZE), not by the slot size. slot->data points into the IBI pool, which i3c_generic_ibi_alloc_pool() sizes at max_payload_len per slot. svc_i3c_master_request_ibi() only rejects a max_payload_len larger than SVC_I3C_FIFO_SIZE, so a driver can request a smaller one. mctp-i3c requests 1. Each readsb() then copies the controller RXCOUNT bytes (up to 31) with no check against the slot size. A device that sends more bytes than the slot holds writes past slot->data, an out-of-bounds write into the IBI pool. Bound the loop by dev->ibi->max_payload_len and clamp each read to the space left in the slot, the same way dw-i3c does. A device can still send more than the requested payload. Flush the leftover bytes ...
EPSS
7.8 High
CVSS3