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CVE-2026-97934

Опубликовано: 25 сент. 2026
Источник: redhat
CVSS3: 7
EPSS Низкий

Описание

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key "cpu", "CPU", "stacktrace" and "STACKTRACE" are generic fields, defined with an offset and a size of zero so that the filter code can match them by name. parse_field() maps them onto their common_* equivalents for backward compatibility, but unlike the common_* names it hands the placeholder back to the caller instead of NULL. create_hist_field() takes a non-NULL field as a promise that the record carries a stacktrace and picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK, so the __data_loc word is read from offset 0, that is from common_type, and its low 16 bits are followed as an offset into the record. What is found there becomes the length of an unbounded memcpy. Pick an event whose id is small enough that the offset stays inside its own record and the length is a kernel text address:

cd /sys/kernel/tracing

echo 'hist:keys=STACKTRACE' > events/ftrace/print/trigger

echo hello > trace_marker

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x23/0x60 RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x30 event_hist_trigger+0x2e7/0x12c0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Leave the field NULL, which is what the comment above the branch says the code does and what common_stacktrace already does. FILTER_CPU and FILTER_COMM are left alone, their create_hist_field() branches never look at the field.

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel. An unbounded memory copy vulnerability exists in the tracing subsystem when processing event histogram keys like STACKTRACE due to improper field pointer handling. A local user with access to the kernel tracing interface can exploit this flaw by setting a specific histogram trigger, leading to memory corruption and a system crash, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).

Отчет

This vulnerability is evaluated as a Moderate severity issue because manipulating event histogram keys requires administrative privileges or access to privileged tracing interfaces under default Red Hat Enterprise Linux settings. While exploitation can crash the operating system or corrupt kernel memory, unprivileged accounts cannot modify the relevant tracefs triggers. Furthermore, earlier enterprise releases, including Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 and 9, do not contain the affected code.

Затронутые пакеты

ПлатформаПакетСостояниеРекомендацияРелиз
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10kernelAffected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6kernelNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7kernelNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7kernel-rtNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8kernelNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8kernel-rtNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9kernelNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9kernel-rtNot affected
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8Not affected
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9Not affected

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Дополнительная информация

Статус:

Moderate
Дефект:
CWE-787
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2541047kernel: tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key

EPSS

Процентиль: 11%
0.00206
Низкий

7 High

CVSS3

Связанные уязвимости

ubuntu
около 1 месяца назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key "cpu", "CPU", "stacktrace" and "STACKTRACE" are generic fields, defined with an offset and a size of zero so that the filter code can match them by name. parse_field() maps them onto their common_* equivalents for backward compatibility, but unlike the common_* names it hands the placeholder back to the caller instead of NULL. create_hist_field() takes a non-NULL field as a promise that the record carries a stacktrace and picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK, so the __data_loc word is read from offset 0, that is from common_type, and its low 16 bits are followed as an offset into the record. What is found there becomes the length of an unbounded memcpy. Pick an event whose id is small enough that the offset stays inside its own record and the length is a kernel text address: # cd /sys/kernel/tracing # echo 'hist:keys=STACKTRACE' > events/ftrace/print/trigger # ec...

nvd
около 1 месяца назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key "cpu", "CPU", "stacktrace" and "STACKTRACE" are generic fields, defined with an offset and a size of zero so that the filter code can match them by name. parse_field() maps them onto their common_* equivalents for backward compatibility, but unlike the common_* names it hands the placeholder back to the caller instead of NULL. create_hist_field() takes a non-NULL field as a promise that the record carries a stacktrace and picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK, so the __data_loc word is read from offset 0, that is from common_type, and its low 16 bits are followed as an offset into the record. What is found there becomes the length of an unbounded memcpy. Pick an event whose id is small enough that the offset stays inside its own record and the length is a kernel text address: # cd /sys/kernel/tracing # echo 'hist:keys=STACKTRACE' > events/ftrace/print/trigger

CVSS3: 5.5
msrc
около 1 месяца назад

tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key

debian
около 1 месяца назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: t ...

github
около 1 месяца назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key "cpu", "CPU", "stacktrace" and "STACKTRACE" are generic fields, defined with an offset and a size of zero so that the filter code can match them by name. parse_field() maps them onto their common_* equivalents for backward compatibility, but unlike the common_* names it hands the placeholder back to the caller instead of NULL. create_hist_field() takes a non-NULL field as a promise that the record carries a stacktrace and picks HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK, so the __data_loc word is read from offset 0, that is from common_type, and its low 16 bits are followed as an offset into the record. What is found there becomes the length of an unbounded memcpy. Pick an event whose id is small enough that the offset stays inside its own record and the length is a kernel text address: # cd /sys/kernel/tracing # echo 'hist:keys=STACKTRACE' > events/ftrace/print/trig...

EPSS

Процентиль: 11%
0.00206
Низкий

7 High

CVSS3