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CVE-2026-98989

Опубликовано: 23 окт. 2026
Источник: redhat
CVSS3: 5.5
EPSS Низкий

Описание

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: check a recursive bind mount for mount namespace loops do_loopback() refuses to bind mount the file of a mount namespace that is as old as the caller's or older because a mount namespace that holds a mount of its own file, or of an ancestor's, would cause a cycle. But it only checks the dentry the bind mount starts from. With MS_REC everything below it is copied and do_loopback() passes CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE so mount namespace files below the source are copied. That's fine for a source in the caller's own mount namespace. Every mount namespace file in there passed the same check when it was bind-mounted. It isn't fine for a source in another mount namespace. may_copy_tree() accepts a bind mount of any nsfs or pidfs file no matter what mount namespace it lives in so that /proc//ns/ and pidfds can be bind mounted. If we create a bind-mount stack of mount namespaces file descriptors the kernel will copy them irrespective of their ancestoral relationship to the mount namespace in question: 151 146 0:7 net:[4026531833] /tmp/nrc/y rw - nsfs nsfs rw 152 151 0:7 mnt:[4026532293] /tmp/nrc/y rw - nsfs nsfs rw Mount 152 is a mount of the mount namespace file of mount namespace 4026532293 inside mount namespace 4026532293. That namespace and every mount in it are leaked... All it takes is a process in an older mount namespace that stacks the file and repeating it leaks without limit: after control: Shmem: 380 kB child: mount(/proc/self/fd/6, MS_BIND|MS_REC): ok after cycle: Shmem: 65916 kB do_move_mount() runs check_for_nsfs_mounts() over a detached tree for exactly that reason. Do the same for the copy before it is grafted.

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel. A local user can exploit this vulnerability by performing recursive bind mounts containing mount namespace file descriptors, bypassing loop detection mechanisms. This issue creates cyclical mount references, preventing the kernel from freeing associated namespaces and mount data. Consequently, repeated exploitation leads to unbounded kernel memory consumption, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).

Затронутые пакеты

ПлатформаПакетСостояниеРекомендацияРелиз
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10kernelFix deferred
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6kernelOut of support scope
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7kernelNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7kernel-rtNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8kernelFix deferred
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8kernel-rtFix deferred
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9kernelFix deferred
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9kernel-rtFix deferred
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8Fix deferred
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9Fix deferred

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Дополнительная информация

Статус:

Moderate
Дефект:
CWE-772
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2559709kernel: namespace: check a recursive bind mount for mount namespace loops

EPSS

Процентиль: 6%
0.00167
Низкий

5.5 Medium

CVSS3

Связанные уязвимости

ubuntu
17 дней назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: check a recursive bind mount for mount namespace loops do_loopback() refuses to bind mount the file of a mount namespace that is as old as the caller's or older because a mount namespace that holds a mount of its own file, or of an ancestor's, would cause a cycle. But it only checks the dentry the bind mount starts from. With MS_REC everything below it is copied and do_loopback() passes CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE so mount namespace files below the source are copied. That's fine for a source in the caller's own mount namespace. Every mount namespace file in there passed the same check when it was bind-mounted. It isn't fine for a source in another mount namespace. may_copy_tree() accepts a bind mount of any nsfs or pidfs file no matter what mount namespace it lives in so that /proc/<pid>/ns/<ns> and pidfds can be bind mounted. If we create a bind-mount stack of mount namespaces file descriptors the kernel will co...

nvd
17 дней назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: check a recursive bind mount for mount namespace loops do_loopback() refuses to bind mount the file of a mount namespace that is as old as the caller's or older because a mount namespace that holds a mount of its own file, or of an ancestor's, would cause a cycle. But it only checks the dentry the bind mount starts from. With MS_REC everything below it is copied and do_loopback() passes CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE so mount namespace files below the source are copied. That's fine for a source in the caller's own mount namespace. Every mount namespace file in there passed the same check when it was bind-mounted. It isn't fine for a source in another mount namespace. may_copy_tree() accepts a bind mount of any nsfs or pidfs file no matter what mount namespace it lives in so that /proc/<pid>/ns/<ns> and pidfds can be bind mounted. If we create a bind-mount stack of mount namespaces file descriptors the kernel will co

CVSS3: 5.5
msrc
14 дней назад

namespace: check a recursive bind mount for mount namespace loops

debian
17 дней назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: n ...

github
17 дней назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: check a recursive bind mount for mount namespace loops do_loopback() refuses to bind mount the file of a mount namespace that is as old as the caller's or older because a mount namespace that holds a mount of its own file, or of an ancestor's, would cause a cycle. But it only checks the dentry the bind mount starts from. With MS_REC everything below it is copied and do_loopback() passes CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE so mount namespace files below the source are copied. That's fine for a source in the caller's own mount namespace. Every mount namespace file in there passed the same check when it was bind-mounted. It isn't fine for a source in another mount namespace. may_copy_tree() accepts a bind mount of any nsfs or pidfs file no matter what mount namespace it lives in so that /proc/<pid>/ns/<ns> and pidfds can be bind mounted. If we create a bind-mount stack of mount namespaces file descriptors the kernel will...

EPSS

Процентиль: 6%
0.00167
Низкий

5.5 Medium

CVSS3

Уязвимость CVE-2026-98989 в Red Hat CVE — exploitDog