Описание
Important: kernel security update
The kernel packages contain the Linux kernel, the core of any Linux operating system.
Security Fix(es):
-
kernel: clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns (CVE-2025-38499)
-
kernel: iommufd: Fix race during abort for file descriptors (CVE-2025-39966)
-
kernel: tls: wait for pending async decryptions if tls_strp_msg_hold fails (CVE-2025-40176)
For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.
Затронутые продукты
Rocky Linux 9
Связанные CVE
Исправления
- Red Hat - 2387670
- Red Hat - 2404107
- Red Hat - 2414524
Связанные уязвимости
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns What we want is to verify there is that clone won't expose something hidden by a mount we wouldn't be able to undo. "Wouldn't be able to undo" may be a result of MNT_LOCKED on a child, but it may also come from lacking admin rights in the userns of the namespace mount belongs to. clone_private_mnt() checks the former, but not the latter. There's a number of rather confusing CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks in various userns during the mount, especially with the new mount API; they serve different purposes and in case of clone_private_mnt() they usually, but not always end up covering the missing check mentioned above.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns What we want is to verify there is that clone won't expose something hidden by a mount we wouldn't be able to undo. "Wouldn't be able to undo" may be a result of MNT_LOCKED on a child, but it may also come from lacking admin rights in the userns of the namespace mount belongs to. clone_private_mnt() checks the former, but not the latter. There's a number of rather confusing CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks in various userns during the mount, especially with the new mount API; they serve different purposes and in case of clone_private_mnt() they usually, but not always end up covering the missing check mentioned above.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns What we want is to verify there is that clone won't expose something hidden by a mount we wouldn't be able to undo. "Wouldn't be able to undo" may be a result of MNT_LOCKED on a child, but it may also come from lacking admin rights in the userns of the namespace mount belongs to. clone_private_mnt() checks the former, but not the latter. There's a number of rather confusing CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks in various userns during the mount, especially with the new mount API; they serve different purposes and in case of clone_private_mnt() they usually, but not always end up covering the missing check mentioned above.
clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns